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I. 
iNTRODUCTION 
On January 11, 2000, the Supreme Court. in Kimel v. Florida Board of 
't Professor, Valpara~so Umversity School ofL:lw. 
tt A~soc1ate Dean and Profcs~or, Valparaiso Umversity School of Law. The authors would Ule 
to thank our re~arch assistants, Drew Broaddus and Sara Ventcicher. both second-year students at 
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Regents,1 held a fedeml civil rights statute unconstitutional for the first time 
in 50 years.2 As a result of Kimel and several other recent Supreme Court 
decisions, the ADEA' and ADA4 claims of state government employees are 
in jeopardy. First, in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,5 the Court 
decided that Congress, when acting pursuant to the Commerce Clause,6 
does not have the authority to abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment1 
immunity. Second, in City of Boerne v. Flores,R the Court restricted the 
power of Congress to pass civil rights Iegblation when acting pursuant to 
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Third, the "spirit" of the Eleventh 
Amendment was expanded to make state court enforcement of federal 
statutory rights dependent upon the states' waiver of their own immunity 
from suit in state court.9 In Kimel, the Court applied these principles to the 
ADEA, holding that Congre'>s did not have the power under Section 5 of 
the Fourteenth Amendment to extend the ADEA to state employers and, 
therefore, did not have the power to abrogate the states' Eleventh 
Amendment immunity.10 During its 2000 term, the Court may extend Kimel 
to the ADA, even though the ADA can be distinguished from the ADEA.11 
1. 528 u.s. 62 (2000). 
2. A MaJnr Chang~ in Ci•·il R1ghts lillgatton, 36 TRIAL 94. March 201Xl. 
3. Age Dt<erimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621, tt stq 
4 Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101. er seq. (1994). 
5. 517 u.s. 44 (1996). 
6. U.S CONST art. l. § 8, cl. 3. 
7 U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
1!. City of Boerne v. Aores. 521 U.S. 507, 519-32 ( 1997) (holding thai because the Free Exercise 
Clau~ of the Fir'l Amendment required that neutml laws only he mtional whereas the Religtous 
I rccdom Restor&tion Act required '>lales to accommodate rcligton unle'' it mel a compelling interest 
tc't the At:l wuld nol he sustained as enforcmg a consututiorwl nonn and thus was invalid). Su also 
United Statts v. Morris(lll, 120 S. Ct. 1740, 1755-58 (2000) (holding the Violence Against Women Act. 
whtch pro\tde' a federo~l ctvil remedy for victims of gender-m<)livllted vtolence, could not be validly 
enacted under Se~:uon 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment hecau-.e, even if there had been evidence of 
gcnder·biased di,parJte treatment by state authorities, the law i' aimed at pmate individuals whereas 
the amendment prohibit' only 'late action and is not restricted to ~tate~ 'Ahere diwrimination against 
victims of gender-motivated crime' exist); Aorida Prepaid Po>tsecondary Education F.Jtpen!>e Board v. 
College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627,640 (1999) (holding th;d because there Wb no e'idence of any 
"ide,pread pauem of patent tnfnngcment b)' stale~>. C(mgre" was precluded from invol..mg it' 
Founeenth Amendment power to abrogate state tmmunity from patent infringement suits); College 
Sanngs Bank v. Aonda Prepaid Po~t-.econdary Education Ell:pcn~ Board. 527 U.S 666.670-75 (1999) 
(hol<hng that because protection ag:unst fahe advenising docs not even implicate property rights 
protected by the due proce•s clau!>C, Congres' could not rely on its Sccuon 5 remedial power to abrogate 
state sovereign immunity under the Lanham Act, which addresses false advenising). 
9. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (holdmg that Congres' lacks the power lo waive the 
states' immunity to Fair Labor Standards Act clauns brought tn state court). 
10. Kimel v. Aorida Bd. of Regents. 528 U.S 62, 82-90 (2000). 
II. UmvcNIIY of Alabama at Btnnmgham Board of Tru<tees \. Garrell, ct'rt. gramed, 120 S. Ct. 
1669 (2000). Su di..cuS\ion of this issue, infra notes 98-126 and accompanying le>.l. Other Acls of 
Congress arc threatened a\ a re!>ult of the dectston in Kimel. Su, t 1(., To\lon-.el " · Ml\soun, 233 F.3d 
1094 (8th Cir 2000): Chinister v. Dcp't of Community and Econ. Dev, 226 I .3d 223 (3" Cir. 2000); 
Katmter v Wtdman. 225 F .3d 519 (5 Cir. 2000); Suns v. Uni\ersJty of Cincinnati, 219 F .3d 559 (6• 
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Several good arguments challenge the reasoning in each of these 
cases. 12 However, it is not the purpose of this article to make those 
arguments. Rather, this article explores the tatus of ADEA and ADA 
litigation against state and local government and suggests ways of possibly 
limiting the effect of Kimel. Each of the following propo itions will be 
addressed in Section II. First, Kimel does not affect ADEA litigation 
against local government because the ADEA represents a valid exercise of 
Congress· power under the Commerce Clause and because local 
governmental entities enjoy no Eleventh Amendment immunity.13 Second, 
by naming state governmental officials in their official capacity and 
utili7ing the Ex parte Young 14 exception to the Eleventh Amendment, state 
government employees can still obtain prospective injunctive relief under 
the ADEA in federal court. 15 Third, in states that have waived immunity 
from employment-related claims in their own courts, state employees can 
bring ADEA claims in state court. 16 Fourth, the EEOC can bring suits in 
federal court on behalf of state government employees to enforce their 
rights under the ADEA. 17 Some of these potential avenue. are more 
Cir. 2000). Hale v. Mann, 219 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 2000) (all hold1ng Congre~' Jacked Section 5 po"-cr to 
abrogate the Eleventh Amendment in passing the Family and Medical Leave Act). 
12. Each of the dcci.,ions of the Supreme Court on the i\~ucs referred to wa' by a 5-4 vote. For 
instance, in Seminole Tribe oj Florida, where the Court overruled the holdmg an Pennsvh•ania 1'. Union 
Gas Co .. 491 U.S. I (1989), dec1ded only seven year~ earlier, Ju,llce Souter stated in hi' dissent that 
"[ijn holdmg the Stale of Aorida immune to suit under the Indiana Gaming Regulatory Act, the Court 
today holds for the lirst time smce the founding of the Republic that Congress has no authorit} to subject 
a state to the jurisdiction of a federal court at the behest of an inthvidual as,erting a federal right." 517 
U.S. atlOO. The dissenting opinions of Justice Stevens and Ju t1cc Souter more than adequately explain 
why Seminole Trib~ of Florida is wrong. 
Second, the decisions from City of Boerne through U.S. 1'. Morriwn. supra note 8, \eriously restrict 
the power of Congres\ under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. If Congress, acung pursuant to 
Section 5 of the fourteenth Amendment, can take no action beyond that w h1ch the Court either has or 
would lind to be in violation of Section I of the Fourteenth Amendment, then Section 5 is relatively 
meaningless. While the majority in Morrison ays "Section 5 i~ 'a positive grant of legislative 
power." ... that mcludes authority to 'prohibit conduct which is not itself unconstuutional and [to] 
intrud(e) mto 'legJslauve 'pheres of autonomy previously reser.•ed to the States,"' Morrison 120 S Ct. 
at 1755, 1ts recent decis1ons seem inconmtent with that view of Section 5. Instead, the Court holcb that 
"prophylacuc legislation under Section 5 must have a 'congruence and proporlionaluy between the 
injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end."' /d. at 1758. Third, the Court· s 
dec1sion to close the door to state courts to enforce federal rights 1~ contrary to earlier cases and, as 
explamed in Jusucc Souter's lengthy dissenting opinion in Alden, 527 U.S. at 760-814, the historical and 
s1are decisis arguments refute the majority'~ Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence. See also Roger 
Hartley, Tlr~ Alden Trilogy: Pratse and Prottst, 23 HARV. J. L & PuB. POL'Y, 323 (2000); Symposium: 
State Sovereign Immunity & Tire Elel'tllllr Amendment, 15 NOTRL DAME L. REV.!! 17 (2000) (critiquing 
the Supreme Court's SO\'ereign immunity decisions from the 1998 term). 
13. Ste infra notes 18-37 and accompanying text. 
14. 209 u.s. 123 (1908). 
15. Su infra notes 38-58 and accompanying text. 
16. Ste mfra note~ 59-91 and accompanying text. 
17. Ste mfra notes 92-97 and accompanying text. 
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problematic than others, but none has been precluded by the Supreme 
Court. Section m will explain why Kimel should not be extended to claims 
of disability discrimination by state employers and will discuss avenues 
other than the ADA for litigating such claims. 
II. 
PROPOSED COURSES OF ACTION TO ENFORCE THE ADEA AGAINST STATE 
AND LOCAL GoVERNMENT 
A. Local Governmental Employees 
Nothing in Kimel suggests Congress did not have the authority to pass 
the ADEA pursuant to its Commerce Clause power. tb Indeed, the Supreme 
Court had already flatly rejected a Tenth Amendment state sovereignty 
defense in EEOC v. Wyoming,''~ where it sustained as a valid exercise of 
the Commerce Clause power the 1974 amendment to the ADEA, which 
extended the Act to include state and local government employers.20 Kimel 
addressed an Eleventh Amendment problem, but the Supreme Court has 
never suggested that the Eleventh Amendment protects local governmental 
entities.:~• In Alden v. Maine, 22 the Court recently reaffirmed that a core 
18. K1mel h1llc.h only thut Congress did not have the power to pass the 1974 amendment e:uendiog 
the ADEA to state and local government pursuant to iL~ power under Section 5 of the Founeenth 
Amendment and, therefore. did not ha\e the power to abrogate the ~tales' Eleventh Amendment 
1mmumty. Kimel v. Honda Bd. of Regent~. 528 U.S. 62, 91. 
19. EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226. 236-39 (1983). See also Garcia v. San Antonio \letro 
Tr..tn\lt, 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
In two recent decision. the Supreme Coun has recognized state 'overeignty as o limitation on 
Congress· Commerce Clauo,e power, but only in the narrow circumstance where Congrc~s 1\ compelling 
the state legislaU\e or executive branch of government to enforce a federal regulatory program. Su 
New York v. United State,, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (holding that federal environmental law 1mpermhsibly 
coerced state lcgi,lature\ mto enacting laws addre.,,ing low level radioactive wn\te); Prinll v. United 
States. 521 U.S. 8911 ( 1997) (holding that Brady Handgun Act impennissibly commanded the 'tates· 
chief law enforcement officer.. to ~earch records to ascertatn whether a person could lawfully purcha\e a 
handgun). The limited nature of this n::striction was confirmed in Condon v. Reno, 5211 U.S. 141 (2000). 
when the Coun unanimous!) upheld the vahdity of the Driver's Privacy Protection Act, which regulate~ 
the di\~emination and use of information contained in state motor vehicle n::cord~ and prohibits \tate 
dcpartmcnb from disclosing personal information. The Coun determined that the Act did not violate the 
Tenth Amendment or principles of federalism bccau'e it did not "require the •aates '" therr soven::ign 
capacity to regulate their O\\n cittzens." /d. at 151. Becau\C federal anti-discrimination laws, such as 
the ADA and ADF.A do not single out states or force them to enact or implement federal statutes, they 
remain unaffected by the\C recent federalism ruhng\. 
20. FEOC \ , Wyoming, 460 U.S. at 243. Su also Humcnansky v. Regents of University ot 
Minnesota, 152 F.3d 822. 826 (8th Cir. 1998): Timmer v. Michigan Dept. of Commerce, 104 F.3d 833. 
840 n.9 (6th Cir. 1997). 
21. See Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 49 I U.S. 58, 70 ( 1989). See also Lincoln County 
v. Lumng. 133 U.S. 529, 530 ( 1890) (holdmg that the Ele\·coth Amendment does not bar a federal suit 
agam't a county). 
22. 527 u.s. 706 ( 1999). 
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principle of the sovereign immunity doctrine "is that it bars suit against 
states, but not lesser entities. The immunity does not extend to suits 
proc;ecuted against a municipal corporation or other governmental entity 
that is not an arm of the state."23 Thus, Congress need neither abrogate 
Eleventh Amendment immunity when regulating local government nor look 
for congressional power to do so in Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
In her majority opinion in Kimel, Justice O'Connor remarks that 
Congress Jacked authority to adopt the 1974 amendment to the ADEA 
pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment because "Congress had 
virtually no reason to believe that state and local governments were 
unconstitutionally discriminating against their employees on the basis of 
age."24 This does not mean, however, that the 1974 amendment is invalid 
as an exercise of Commerce Clause power; the Court docs not overturn the 
holding in EEOC v. Wvoming that age discrimination, even if not contrary 
to the Equal Protection Clause, adversely affects interstate commerce and 
thus falls within Congress' power. Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, as a source of congressional authority for the 1974 
amendment of the ADEA, became important only after the Court 
determined that Congres · could not abrogate Eleventh Amendment 
immunity when acting pursuant to the Commerce Clause,zs and thus state 
employers cannot be sued in federal court without their consent. Aside 
from th1s re triction, the 1974 amendment to the ADEA remains valid as to 
both state and local government employers, and it can be enforced in 
federal court when suing a local governmental unit.26 
The decision in Kimel may cause local governmental employers to 
argue that they are really state agencies or arms of the state in order to take 
advantage of Eleventh Amendment protectionY Determining the status of 
state agencies requires a careful review of state law2R and, since the primary 
~~- /d. Ill 756. 
:!4. K1mel v. florida Bd. of Regent\, 528 U.S 62, 91 (2000). 
:!~. Seminole Tribe of florida v florida. 517 U.S. 44 ( 1996) 
:!to. Su. ~-~·· Conle> v. Village of Bedford, 215 L 3d 703 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that 
municipality is not entitled to I:.lcventh Amendment immunity and ADEA suit could proceed in federal 
coun): Nann v. Lo~er Menon School Dist .. 206 F.3d 323 (3rd Cir. 2000) (holding that plruntiffs 
ADEA claim is allowed to proceed as school district is not ann of the stale enUiled to Eleventh 
Amendment Immunity): Gav1gnn v. Clarkstown Central School D1~1 .. 84 F.Supp.2d 540 (S.D.N.Y 
2000) (holdmgthat ~chool distnct1s not entitled to Eleventh Amendment 1mmunity from ADEA suit). 
27. Su. e.g .. Conley, 215 F.3d 703; Narin, 206 f .3d 323; Gavignan, 84 F.Supp.2d 540. 
:!t!. Se~. ~.g .• Mt. Healthy City School Di~l. v. Doyle, 429 U.S 274, 280 (1977) (explaining that 
'wte law defined a ..chool board as a political subdivision): Rounds v. Oregon State Board of Higher 
Education, 166 F.3d 1032. 1035-36 (9th Cir 1999) (holding that the University of Oregon, a.~ well as the 
Oregon Swte Board of H1gher Educauon, is an ann of the state for Eleventh Amendment purposes 
l>ecau..c the uni\ersity i~ not nn independent legal entity and it perfonns central government functions 
under the control of the Board of Education); Ambus v. Granite Board of Education, 975 F.2d 1555, 
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purpo.;e of the Eleventh Amendment was to protect state treasuries, the 
source of funds to satisfy any judgment becomes important.29 However, 
other factors may also be important to the analysis. For example, in Mr. 
-62 (10th C1r. 1992) modified en bane 995 F.2d 992 ( lOth Cir. 1993) (holding that because of 
ual autonomy from state government and financial independence from state treasury, local 
board in Utah b not ann of state for Eleventh Amendment purposes); Carr v. Cny of Florence, 
~16 F.2d 1521, 1525-26 (lith Cir. 1990) (holding that because under state law sheriff b \ 1ewed a.~ 
ll\·e ofliccr of ~tate and his depuues are under significant control of ~henff, oflicial capacity ~uits 
't ~uch officials are shielded by Eleventh Amendment even though officials are paid by county and 
ty pt:r..onnel board e}(crcises some control over terrns and conditions of depuues' emplo) ment; 
there is no clear ev1dcnce that counties will pay damage award against sheriff or h1~ deputies, the) 
.e 1mmune from suit under Eleventh Amendment); Meade v. Grubbs, 841 F.2d 1512, 1525 (10th Cir. 
) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment issue is determined by e}(amining power~. nature and 
charactcru.ucs of agency under state law); Darlak v. Bobear, 814 F.2d 1055, 1059-60 (5th Cir. 1987) 
(holding that the state Dcpanmcnt of Health and Human Resources and its hospital were alter ego' of 
uue entitled to immunity \\here state law characterized department as arrn of state and any judgment 
against either pany would be paid from state funds). 
29. Lake County Estate>. lnc. '. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 44() U.S. 391, 401-02 ( 1979) 
(finding bi-~tate authority i-. not an arm of the state based on independence of agency, fact that funding 
was provided by neighboring counties, and fact that judgments agautst the agency were e}(prcssly not 
going to bind either state); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 665 (1974) (holding that Eleventh 
Amendment IS tnggcred where monetary relief will tnevitably come from the general revenue' of the 
-.tate); Dover Elevator Co. v. Arkansa~ State Umv., 64 F.Jd 442, 446-47 (8th Cir, 1995) (holding that 
~tate university, which could not spend fund-. w1thout appropnation by general assembly, is ~tate agency 
protected by Eleventh Amendment); Christy v. Pennsylvania TumpiL:e Comm'n. 54 F.3d 1140. 1145 
(3rd Cir. 1995) (placing special emphasis on funding factor, and finding that. based on fundmg, ~talus at 
state law, and autonomy, a' well as totality of factors, Commi~sion is ~ubjcct to suit in fcdeml court); 
Ba}(ter by Baxter v. Vigo County Sch. Corp., 26 F.3d 728, 732-33 (7th Cir. 1994) (noting that mo\t 
Significant factor i~ whether entity has power to raise 1ts own funds and concluding after review of 
Indiana statutory scheme, that, even though state exercises some supervision over count) welfare 
department-.. they arc not protected by Eleventh Amendment because they have their own taxing and 
bonding power and ab1lity to satisfy judgments by means other than resorting to state treo.~sury): Sherman 
v. Curator.. of Univ. of Missouri, 16 F.3d 860 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that whether or not srate 
university is protected by Eleventh Amendment i~ determined by looking to degree of local autonomy 
and control, and most importantly whether funds to pay JUdgment could come from state trea.sury; ca-.e 
remanded for determination in light of plaintiffs allegation~ that only one-third of univer.ity budget 
comes from -.tate appropriation and a judgment would not nece~sarily be paid from the state funds); 
Hut!o.ell v. Sayre, 5 F. 3d 996,999-1002 (6th Cir. 1993) (holdmg that University of Kentucky IS an arm of 
the \tate entitled to Eleventh Amendment protection because budget i~ set by the legislature as part of 
the go,emor's executive budget and a monetary judgment would be paid from the state treasury): 
Boeke~ '· Fields, 999 F.2d 788, 790-91 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding that County ~partment of Soc1al 
SerYices protected from damage awards by Eleventh Amendment because the judgment would be paid 
from a self-in~urance progmm that i~ 80% state funded): Metcalf & Eddy, Inc. v. Puerto Rico Aqueduct 
& Sewer Auth., 991 F2d 935, 940-41 (1st Cir. 1993) (holding that sewer authority has no access to 
Commonwealth treasury and therefore Eleventh Amendment does not protect it even though it receive~ 
pan of its funds from Common\loealth; mabihty to draw on pubhc fisc "cripple-;" immunil) defense): 
Rivas '· freeman, 940 F.2d 1491, 1495 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that because fund~ used to satisfy 
liability of -.heriff and deputies do not come from state treasury, there IS no Eleventh Amendment 
protection): Holley v. La,ine, 605 F.2d 638,644 (2nd Cir. 1979) (holding that local service agency may 
be sued a-. an independent political enuty wh1ch bear. "ultimate responsibility" for public assistance 
payments, since state \\as under no requirement to indemnify counlles for judgmenLs rendered against 
it). 
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Healthy City School District v. Do.vle, 30 the Court held that a school board 
does not enjoy Eleventh Amendment immunity because state law defined a 
school board as a political subdivision and because the school board was 
given the power to issue bonds and levy taxes under state law .31 Although 
the school board was subject to guidance from the State Board of Education 
and received a significant amount of funding from the state, it could be sued 
in federal court.32 In Edelman v. Jordan, the Court stressed that the 
Eleventh Amendment is triggered where monetary relief will inevitably 
come from the general revenues of the state, indicating that a raid on the 
state treasury is the primary concern.33 Later, in a case involving a bi-state 
authority,34 while the Court identified several factors to be considered in 
determining the immunity issue, it emphasized that the twin reasons for the 
Eleventh Amendment-the states' dignity and prevention of federal court 
judgments that must be paid from the state treasury-remain the ''prime 
guide."35 The latter of these reasons was referred to as the "impetus for the 
Eleventh Amendment,"36 which was enacted in the wake of a Supreme 
Court decision allowing a damage action to proceed against a state in 
federal court. 37 
Once it is determined that a governmental employer is, in fact, not 
protected by the Eleventh Amendment, ADEA claims against such an 
employer should be allowed to proceed in federal court. However, the 
plaintiffs in such cases should be prepared to address the threshold question 
relating to the status of the governmental employer. 
B. Naming State Govemmental Officials in Their Official Capacity 
This would be a relatively non-controversial avenue into federal court 
for state employees seeking to enforce the ADEA were it not for recent 
circuit court decisions holding that liability under the federal employment 
discrimination statutes-ADEA, Title Vll, and the ADA- is generally 
limited to the employer and does not include agents of the employer.3~ 
30. 429 u.s. 274 (1977). 
31. /d., 429 U.S. at 280-81. 
32. /d. 
33. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 665-66 ( 1974). 
34. The Port Authoriry, e\tablished by New York and New Jer~y puf\uant to the lnter<itatc 
Commerce Clause of the U.S. ConMitution, Art. I,§ 10, ct. 3. 
35. Hess v. Port Auth. Tr.ms-Hudson Corp .. :513 U.S 30,47 (1994). 
~6. /d. at 48. 
37. Chisholm v. Georgia. 2 Dall. 419 (1793), whtch holds that Article ITI authorized a pmate 
citizen of another ~tate to sue the state of Gcorgta without tts consent, is generally vte~cd as the catal)"'t 
for the Eleventh Amendment. See, e.g .. Welch v. State Dept. of Highways and Pub. Transp .. 483 U.S. 
468,484-85 (1987). 
:18. Su. e.g .. Silk v. Caty of Clucago, 194 F.3d 788 <7th Cir. 1999) (boldmg thut ADA provides 
only for employer, not mdividualliabihty); Wathen v. General Elec. Co., 115 F.3d 400. 405 (6th Cir. 
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These decisions are questionable because the definition of "employer" in 
these statutes includes agents of the employer.39 The circuits, in fact, were 
divided on the individual liability question40 until Congress added a damage 
remedy to Title VII in 1991.41 The concern reflected in many post-1991 
decisions seems to be to avoid individual liability for damages on the part 
of corporate officials.42 For example, in the context of sexual harassment 
19971 (holding thai mdiVIdual habtlny ., protubued under Title VII): Mason v. Stalling,, K2 F.3d 1007 
(11th Cir 1996) (boldmg that Title I ol ADA does not provide for indi' idualliability, only for employer 
linbilityl; Stults v. Conoco. Inc. 76 F.3d 651,655 (5th Cir 1996) (holding that the ADEA prov1des no 
ba.'•' for mdividualliahility for supem\Ory employee~): Thelen v. :'vf.Jrc·~ Big Boy Corp .. 64 F.3d 264, 
267 n 2 (7th Cir. 19951 (rcfening to its ruling in ADA cal><:, coun indicates "it., likely that Stephen 
Marcus, as an individual, could not be liable und.:r the ADEA"); E.E.O.C. Y. AIC Sec. Investigation,, 
Ltd .. 55 F . .3d 1276, 1279-82 <7th Cir. 1995 ). rt-h tn bane dt-nrt'd. June 28, 1995 (holdtng that O\\<ner of 
compan)' not indi\iduall) hablc under ADA): Smith '. Lomalt. 45 F 3d 402, 403·404 n.4 (II th Cir. 
1994) (holding that count)' commhs•oner\ may not be held individually liahh: under ADF.A ): Birbcck' 
Mane: I Lighting Corp .. ,,0 F.3d 507.510-11 (4th Cir. 1994), art. dtmi~d. 513 L...S 105!! ( 1994) (holdmg 
that the ADEA doe' not prov ide for indiYiduaJ hab1hty of supen i\lll' \\ho made deCI\IOn to dhcharge 
plaint if!\); Miller v. \ttallwell's lnt'l. Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 5!!7 -88 (9th C1r. 1993), em dt'nil'd, 510 U.S. 
1109 (1994) (rccogni11ng contrary authority, coun holds that Congres~ d1d not 1ntc:nd to impo~e 
individual liability on employees under AOI!A); Bushy v. City of Orl<~ndo, 931 I· .2d 764. 772 (I I th Cir. 
1991) (holding that di,charged black c•t} pollee officer could not mamtam Title VTI action again~t 
~a)or, Police Caplam. and Chief in thc1r individual capacity becau'e indi,idual l'llpacuy suit;. are 
inappropriate under T1tle VU) . 
. '9. Age Di-.crimination in F.mploymenr Act. 29 L...S.C. § 630(b): Amcncan' Wuh Di~abtlitie, 
,\ ct. 42 L.. .S.C. § 1211 )(5)(A); Title Vll of the Civ1l RJ~hts Act of 1964.42 U.S.C § 2000c(b). 
«<l. Su. t.f!. .. Shager '. Up John Co .. 9 n F.2d 398, 404 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that statutory 
language of ADEA could mean that supervi~or is liable along with employer, or even pos~ibly mstead of 
employer); Parolinc v. Um~)' Corp .. 879 F.2d 100, 106 (4th Cir 19!!9) (holding that individual qualifies 
as an "employer" under T1tle Vll tf he or ~he ~n;es in a supervisory position and e'erci~' \ignificant 
control over plaintiff' h1ring, firing. or conditioru. of employment, and such an employee may be held 
liable for any actionable -e\ual h31'lb,ment m which he or ~he personally panicipated); Jones v. 
Continental Corp .• 789 f'.2d 1225. 1231 (6th Cir. 1986) (li,ting ~Ycral ca~' holding that indi\'lduah 
may be held per\onally liable as agents of employers under Title Vlll: Barkley '. Carraul\.. 533 r Supp. 
242, 24'i I S.D. Tex. 19!!2) (holding that indi' tdual dcpanmenl man.1gcrs of corporate defendant are not 
entitled to dismi~~al when sued under ADEA). 
41. The statutory authori.tation for damages i' found m 42 V.S.C. § 1981 a. wh1th applies to T itle 
VII actions as well as those brought to enfor1.-e the ADA. Both Title VII and the ADA define the word 
"employer" to mcludc "agent,." See 5upra note 39. 
4:!. Su, t.g .• Onez '·Washington Count)'. State of Or.:gon, 88 F . .3d !!O·t 808 (9th C1r. 1996) 
!holding that Title vn claims against individuals sued 10 their mdividuall'llp3Ctties \\ere dl'·missed. but 
claim~ against indi,iduah in their official capacitie~ \\t:n: allowed); Tomka v. Seiler Corp .. 66 F.3d 
1295. 1314 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that an interpretatiOn of Title Vn to allow for mdmdual supen i~or 
liah•hty would produce a result at odds with congressional intent to protect small cmplo)tr\ and. 
therefore, an emplo)er's agent should nm he held indl\ •dually liable under Title VJI) Welch Y. Laney, 
57 F.3d 11>04. 1009 (lith Cir. 1995) (holding that T itle VII plaintiff has a cause of acuon again't the 
sheriff in his official capac•ty. but not h1s indi,idual capac•ty): Lehhardt v Basic lnst. of Tech. 55 F 3d 
377. 380 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that although mdtviduah cannot be sued m their indl\ idual capacttJes 
under Title VII. ~uch acllons can be brought agailbt individual employee' in their official capacitie,); 
BirbccL. '· Man·cllc Lighting Corp .. 30 F.3d 507.510 (4th Cir. 1994) ("It \\OUid be incongruou~ to hold 
that the ADEA docs not apply to the owner of a busine" employing. for e~amplc. ten people. but that 11 
doc) apply \\ith full force to a per;on "ho supervi~, the same numher of worJ..er\ in a compan) 
employing twenty or more."); Sauer' v. Salt Lake County. I F. 3d I I 22. 1125 (10th Cir 1993)(holding 
that under Tille vn. ,uits mu't proceed against ind1viduab in their official capaciue' only: ind1' idual 
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claims under Title VII, the individual responsible for the harassment cannol 
be required to atisfy a monetary judgment.4~ 
The exclus ion of suits against "agents" is not a major roadblock where 
capacrty \uits arc inappropriate); Haney v. Blake. 913 F.2d 226, 227-211 , 'ith C ir. 1990) (explaming that 
the pnl\ i\ron rn Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000clbl. means that indrvidual~ acting as nn employer's 
"agent\" \\-Ill he lrahlc rn thctr official capacllles only). s~~ also Knsti Lappe. "/ Ju.\1 Work Her~"; 
Pr~cluding .'iupt'rvimn ' lndil'ldual Liability Under lh~ F~d~ral Amidi1criminutirm StuJutes and the 
Ari:ona Cil'll Ri.~hts Act, 27 AR17- ST L. 1 1301. 1311 (1996) ("Mo~t crn:uit\ that have addressed the 
i~sue of individual hahihty pursuant to the antidiscrimioatron acb pn:1perly concluded that courts should 
not impo-e indr\rdual liability. In declining to imP<l'le <,uch liahrlrty, the couns examined the 
antrdisc.:nminatron statutes, the doctrine of re~pondeat 'uperior. the economrc mmitleauons of impo\ing 
indi\ idual liability, and the polrcy consideration-. underlying the >tatutes."): Christopher Greer, l'ote, 
"Who. Ml· ''.A Supenisor's lndn·iduall.iubilityfor Di.1crimmullon in the Workplace, 62 FOROHA\1 L. 
REV. 1835, 1836 ( 1994) ("Ba<;ed on the purpo,;c. of the Acts. their talutory language, and the ca<;e law, 
individuals can and ~hnuld he held liable for their dbcriminatory act'> under hoth Title VlJ and the 
ADF.A."l 
Cf. Canderlaria v. Cunnrngham, 2000 WL 798636 CS.D.N Y. 2000) (reJecung the disuncuon ba!>ed 
on capacity, the coun held that rndividuals may not be held hable under the ADA in either capacity); 
Bouagc v. Suburban Propane. 77 F Supp. 2d 3 10. 313 (N.D.N Y 2000) (holdrng that an employee 
could not bring Title vn or ADEA claims against individual defendant' in therr personal or official 
capacities e\en if 'he "'as seekrng prospective mjuncthe relief agarn\t .. uch defendants; any distmction 
between holding individuals li:~hle in their official or pei"''nal capacity would place the coun in a 
po~ition of holding an individual liable without providing the employee "rth a remedy at law); Pcmrick 
v. Stra.:hc:r. 67 F Supp. 2d 149, 169 (E.D '< Y. 1999) (holding that rndi\·idual liability bar applie!> to 
rndividu"l defend.mt\ in therr official capacrtie,, as well :l'> to '>!lunuons when: the plaintiff <;eek\ 
pmspecti\1.~ injunctive rclicfagainst such individual-): McBride v. Routh, 51 F Supp. 2d 153. 156 (D 
Conn. 1999) (queMioning the utrlity of the oftlciaUindividual capacity di'>tim:uon) . 
.n. See. e.R·· Grant v. !.ode Star Co., 21 F.3d 649.651 53 (5th Cir 1994), cut. dt'nit'd, 513 U.S 
I 0 15 (1994) (holdmg that the dl\trict coun improperly held emplo}'ee · s ~uperior hablc for o:exually 
harassing her because Title Vll contemplates liability only for the employer); Smrth v. St. Bernard's 
Reg' l Med Ctr .. 19 F.3d 1254, 1255 (8th Cir 1994) (holding that claims again~t individual defendants 
were properly dismi~'ed because liahrlrty under Trtlc VII can attach only to employers); Sauers v Salt 
Lake County, I I .3d 1122, 1125 (10th Crr 1993) (holding that since indi~idua! capacity 'urts arc 
inappropriate under Title VII. ouit again\! county auorn.:y could proceed only in hrs officral capacity 
and, thu,, opemted as suit again~l c1>unty it'>elf; thus. plamtiffs rnitial complaint failing to name the 
county \hould be deemed to relate back to onginal complaint \\-here county allomey "a' named a.~ 
dt:fendantl: ~1rllcr v. Maxwell's lnt'l. Inc., 99 1 F.2d 583,587 19th Cir. 1993). ct>n. d~m~d. 510 U.S 
1107 (199-l) (holding that although the tenn "employer" under Title VIIi' defined to include any agent 
of the employer. thi. language wa' rncluded to incorporate rt'~pondeat supenor liability and docs not 
ju~tify imposing indi\idual lial'lility on ~upen isory employee,; blatutory scheme of Title Vll. which 
limib lial'lility of 'mall employers even as amended, indicates that Congress did not intend to impo'e 
individualliahility 1m employees): Harvey v. Blake, 913 F.2d 226, 227-2!1 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that 
un) recovery again\t ~upcrvisor must be in her ofticial rather than mdivrdual capacity, because 
' upervr,or'' lr.1bilrty under Title vn is premi'ed upon her role as an agent of the crty); Padway v. 
Palches. 665 F.2d 96'i. 968 (9th Cir 1982) (holding that hack pay awards arc to be paid hy the 
employer. not rndr\ rdua.l defendants); Johnwn v N Indiana Puh. Serv Co., 844 F. Supp . .t66, 468 (N D. 
lnd. 1994) (linding no individual liability): Pelech v Klaff.Jo\S, L.P. 828 F. Supp. 525. 529 ( .D. Ill. 
1993) (holding that indr~rdual supcn·isors are not "employers" whu can be sued under Title vn rn therr 
individual capacrty); Pommier v. James L. Edelstein Enter·,, 816 F. Supp. 476, 480 (N.D. Ill. 1993) 
(holding that 'upen isor may not be individually liahle for T itle Vll sexual discriminallon, but " an 
agent liable only in hr' official capacity); Wei's v. Coca Cola Bonhng Co. of Chicago. 772 F Supp. 
407. 410-11 CN D. Ill. 1991) (finding ~upeni,or i-. liahlc !!1r !>Cxual harassment only rn hi\ oflictal 
capacil) , i c .. "-'a surrogate for the emplo)er). 
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a private sector employer is sued. However, because Kimel foreclo!.es suit 
against state employers, litigants and courts should revisit the question of 
whether "agents" may be named, at minimum, to enjoin continuing 
violations of the ADEA. In suits against government officials, there is a 
long-standing recognition that the capacity in which the individual is sued is 
important. Beginning with Ex parte Young, the Supreme Court recognized 
that state officials could be sued in their official capacity, providing an 
opportunity for injunctive relief without individual liability . .w This well-
established exception to the Eleventh Amendment was confirmed in 
Alden.45 However, the Court has made it clear that the Ex parte Young 
"fiction" allows only prospective injunctive relief designed to end the 
illegal action, not retroactive relief that results in a raid on the state 
treasury :~6 Damages may not be awarded by the federal courts against the 
governmental officials. in their official capacity, because such suits are, in 
effect, suits against the governrnent.47 
44. Ex pane Young. 209 U.S. 123, 155-56 (1908). Sre also Will v. Michigan Depl. of State 
Police, 491 U.S 58. 70 n. 10 (1989). 
45. Alden v. Maane, 527 U.S. 706,757 (1999) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment "does not 
bar certain actions again'>t ~tare officers for injunctive or declaratory relief."). 
46. Su Green v. Mansour. 474 U.S. 64,68 (1985); Pennhur.t State Sch. and Ho~p. \". Halderman, 
465 U.S 89, 102-03 ( 1984); Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332.337 (19791: Eldennan v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 
651.668 (1974). 
47. See Edelman\. Jordan. 415 U.S. 651.663 (1974); Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464,472-73 
( 1985). See alw Carnphdl v. Arlan'a' Dept. of Corr. 155 F.3d 950, 962 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that 
while state officials can be sued in federal court in their official capacitie~ for pro,peclive injunctive 
relief. including reanstatemem. the alternative remedy of front pay is not analogous to pro~pective relief 
because it must be paid from the state treasury); Barber v State of Hawaii, 42 F. 3d I 185, 1198 (9th Cir. 
1994) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment bars award of damages agaanst ~tate officaals an their 
official capacaty); Nnuve Village of Noatak v. Blatchford, 38 F.3d 1505. 1511 -13 (9th Cir. 1994) 
(finding that order requiring state commissioner to disbur..e funds to pluanuff, when funds "ere held 
pursuant to court order pending outcome of litigation, is not prospective relief and \lonuld affect state 
treasury; therefore Ele\enth Amendment bar.. plaintiff's claim to disputed fund.,); Estate of Poner by 
Nelson v. State of Illinois, 36 1.3d 684, 690 (7th Cir. 1994) (holdang that suits namang state of!iciat.. in 
their official capacity are barred by Eleventh Amendment if they seck retroactive relief (damages) from 
~tate treasury): Arnold v. McClain. 926 F.2d 963. 966 (lOth Cir. 1991) (holdang that district attorney is 
\tate officer and claim for damages again~! him in his oflicial capacity is barred); Chrissy F. by Medley 
v. Mississippi Dept. of Pub. Welfare, 925 F.2d 1144, 849 (5th Cir 1991) (holding that claim for damages 
against state officer in officaal capacity is barred by Eleventh Amendment); Hughes v. Savell, 902 F.2d 
376, 378 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that state is real party in Interest if decision rendered would operate 
again'! 'O\Creagn, expending it\elf on the public treal.ury. interfering with public administration. or 
compelling the state to act or to refman from acting); DeYoung v. Patten, 898 F.2d 628. 635 ,8th Cir. 
1990) (holding that where complaant :.tate:. cla1m against official~ in their official capacity, it is not 
sufticicntly clear to g•ve them nouce that the) are heang sued in their andividual capacity; where 
complaant failed to specaf) whether a third official 1\ heang sued in official or individual capacity or 
both, complaint must be construed as stating only official capacit) claim barred by Eleventh 
Amendment). m·~mlled on other ground~ by Forbes v. Arkansas Educ. Tele\iSIOn Communication 
Network Found .. 22 F.3d 1423 (8th Cir. 199~); Holloway v. Conger, 896 F.2d 11 31. 1136 (8th Cir. 
1990) (holding that suit against state board and its members in thear official capacaty, which seek\ only 
damages. is barred by Eleventh Amendment); Free v. Granger, 887 I .2d 1552. 1557 (II th Clf. 1989) 
(holding that ~uits ag:unM officials in their official capacity for damages arc effccthcly suits agaanst the 
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Even if one accepts the circuit court opm10ns designed to protect 
corporate officials from individual liability in actions under the federal anti-
discrimination statutes, there is no reason why these decisions should be 
expanded to claims for prospective injunctive relief against state 
governmenlal officials in their official capacity .48 In Alden, the Court 
invoked Ex parte Young and reiterated that sovereign immunity "does not 
bar certain actions against state officers for injunctive or declaratory 
relief."49 While such suits are, in reality, suits against the state, the Ex parte 
Young fiction avoids some of the effects of the current Court's expansive 
interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment, and it has long been recognized 
that this fiction is critical in ensuring state compliance with federal 
statute!-.. 5° As part of its federalism agenda, the Supreme Court has chipped 
away at the Ex parte Young exception, but the damage appears to be minor 
and, for the majority of Justices, the rule remains alive.~~ Suits against state 
entity which are prohibited by the Eleventh Amendment absent waiver since any damage award would 
be paid out of the state treasury); Lenca v. Lane, 882 F.2d 1171. 1178 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that 
although plamtiff sued individual defendanL~ in their individual capacities for back pay, claim was really 
one for retroactive award of monetary relief from state treasury and did not have merely an "ancillary'' 
effect on state treasury and is thus barred by Eleventh Amendment); Meadov.s v. Indiana, 854 F.2d 
1068, 1069 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding that where complaint fai ls to designate whether action against 
individual dcfendanL~ i~ official capacity or pen.onaJ capacity, court will assume official capacity 
complamt barred by Eleventh Amendment); Wisconsin Hosp. Ass'n v. Retvitz, 820 F.2d 863. 867 (7th 
Cir. 191!7) (holding that ~uit brought against state officials. but with object of obtaining pecuniary relief 
from state itself, is squarely within the scope of Eleventh Amendment); Graham v. Nat'! Collegiate 
Athletic Ass'n, 804 F.2d 953, 959-60 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding that where plaintiffs seek to impose no 
liability on university officials as indivitluaJs, but have directed all their argument~ against university. 
suit is ehsentially one for recovery of money from state treasury). 
4ll. See employment case~ cited supra note 42, sec abo Armstrong v. Wilson, 124 F.3d 1019, 
I 026 (9th Cir. 1997). cert. denied, 524 U.S. 937 ( 1998) (holding. in action seeking prospective 
mjunctive rehefto end discrimination against inmates with disability. that such relief fits within £t parte 
Young exception to Eleventh Amendment); Welch v. Laney, 57 F.3d 1004, 1008-09 (lith Cir. 1995) 
(holding ba.,ed on stale law that sheriff is state, rather than county, official; Eleventh Amendment 
applies but docs not bar prospective injunctive relief against hhcriff); Uttilla v. Tennessee Highway 
Dept. 40 F. Supp. 2d 968. 975-77 (W.D. Tenn. 1999), af!'d 208 f.3d 216 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that 
plaintiffs may pun.ue declaratory and injunctive relief again\t commissioner in his official capacity in 
suit brought under Tide ll of ADA); Henrietta D. v. Guiliani, 8 1 F. Supp. 2d 425,430 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) 
(holding that the Eleventh Amendment does not preclude suit against Commi\sioner of the New York 
State Department of Soc•al Services seeking access to publici}' subsidized benefits). 
+9. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. at 757. 
50. CHARLLS ALAN WRIGHT, L AW OF fEDERAL COURTS 292 (1983) ("[TJhe doctrine of Ex parte 
Young seems indispensable to the establishment of constitutional government and the rule of law."). 
51. In Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 ( 1996), the Court held that courts should 
hesitate before allowing use of the Ex parte Young exception "where Congress has prescribed a detailed 
remedial scheme for the enforcement against a State of a statutorily created right[.]" /d. at 74. An 
Indian tribe was not allowed to usc the £'C parte Yow1g exception in Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of 
ldalw, 521 U.S. 261 (1997), a case de~cribed as '"unusual in that the Tribe's \uit is the functional 
equivalent of n quiet title action which implicates ~peciaJ sovereignty interests." /d. at 281. Here, the 
Tribe sought a determination that certain lands are not within the regulatory juriMiiction of the state and 
it sought injunctive relief barring state officials frome~ereising their governmental powers and authority 
over the disputed area. If the Tribe were to prevail, the Coun indicated "Idaho's sovereign interest in its 
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government officials in their official capacity, where the plaintiff seeks 
injunctive relief, thus provide a viable approach to ADEA claims by state 
government employees. 
Of course, such suits do not provide full relief to ADEA plainLiffs. 
Because the Ex parte Young fiction allows only prospective injunctive 
relief, back pay is not available. 52 Compensatory and punitive damages are 
generally not available under the ADEA in any case.53 Prospective 
lands and water would be affected in a degree fully :h iniCUsive a.' almost any conceivable retroactive 
levy upon fund' in its trea\ury. Under these particular and special ctrcumstances, we find the Youn~ 
e"ception inapplicable." /d. at ::!87 (empha~is added). Although Justice Kennedy. joined by Jusucc 
Rehnquist. argued in favor of a more drastic rcvisioo \\.here courts would engage in an ad hoc 
"balancing and accommodation of state interests when determining whether the Young el\cept1on apphes 
in a given case," id. at 278, the majority rejected this approach. 
Lower courts have recx>gnized that these two case~ tmposc a narrow el\ccption and that & parte 
Young remains the rule. Su. e.g .• Sandoval v. Hagan, 197 F.3d 484,500 (l ith Cir. 1999J,cer/. granted, 
121 S. Ct. 28 (2000) (Semmole does ntlt bar J:.x parte Young action because Section 602 of Title V1 
contains no e:'tplicit rcmedtal ~cheme); Hart'. Valdez, 186 F.3d 1280. 1286 (10th Cir. 1999} (ellplammg 
that Coeur d'Alene ts distingui~hed because a state's interest in admini;,tenng a welfare pwgram 
partially funded by the federal government is not ~uch a core -.overcign interest as to preclude Ex pane 
Young); Summit Mcd. As~ocs. v. Pr)or, 180 F.3d 1326. 1340 (lith Cir. 1999) (explaining that Coeur 
d'Alene is distinguished because the ~tate's real property interests are not at stake; although Alabama 
ha~ an intere~t 10 regulating the o~bortions of viable fetuse~. a declaro~tory judgment Y.ould not prevent 
the state from regulating late· term abortion' 1n other ways and ~hould not be barred by Eleventh 
Amendment); Litis v. Univ. of Kansas Med. Ctr .. 163 F.3d 1186, 1197 (lOth Cir. 1998) (holdmg that 
Seminole'.\ detailed remedial 'cheme analys1s doe\ not apply because Seminole did not limn the use of 
Er parte Young as the means of enforcing con~titutional rights); Branson Sch. D1't Rl:.-82 v. Romer, 
161 F.3d 619. 632 (lOth Cir. 1998) (holding that fundamental sovereign!) issues arc not implicated 
when plaintiff ~eks the functional eqUivalent of a breach of ICUst acuon seekmg onl) prospective 
inJunctive rehef again>t state officials, so Ex parte Young is apphcable): Buchwald v. Univ. of New 
Mex1co Sch. of Med., 159 F.3d 487.496 (lOth Cir 1998) (holding that Couerd'Aiene limitation only 
applies in "unique circumstances" and not when requested relief will not affect the core aspect' of state 
sovere1gnty; it only applie~ in "unique circumstances"): Marie 0. '.Edgar. 131 F jd 610, 617 (7th Cir. 
1997) (distinguishing Coeur d'Alene because no 1mportant sovereignty intcre~t~ arc at stake when 
plaintiff is seektng to enforce compliance wtth a federal program). 
52. Back pay is available under the ADEA in case~ Y.herc the Eleventh Amendment ., not a 
con-.dcration. See, e.g., Banks v. Tra\clers Cos., 180 F.3d 358, 364 (2nd Cir. 1999): Mo~e v S. Union 
Co., 174 F.3d 917, 927 (!lth Cir. 1999); EEOC v. Ma\Se) Yardley Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 117 F.3d 
1244. 1251 (lith Cir. 1997); Newhouse v. McCormick & Co .. lnc., 110 F.3d 635,639 (8th Cir 1999); 
EEOC v. Kentucky State Police Dept., 80 F.3d 1086, 1097 (6th Cir. 1996); Smith \. Officer of 
Per,onncl Mgmt., 778 F.2d 258, 261 (5th Cir. 1985). 
53. See, e.g., Espinueva v. Garrett. 895 F.2d 1164. 1165 (7th C1r}. reh 'g. denied. 498 U.S. 891 
(1990); Bruno v. Western Elcc. Co., 829 F.2d 957, 966-67 (lOth Cir. 1987); Goldstein ' Manhattan 
lndu,., Inc., 758 F.2d 1435, 1446 (lith Cir. 1985); Johnson v AI Tech Specialty Steel Corp., 73 1 F.2d 
143, 148 (2nd Cir. 1984): Perrell v. Finance American Corp .. 726 F.2d 654.657 (lOth Cir. 1984); Htll v. 
Sp1egel. Inc., 708 F.2d 233. 235 (6th Cir. 1983); Kolb v. Goldring, Inc .• 694 F2d 869. 872 (1st Cir. 
1982); Pfeiffer v. Essex Wire Corp., 682 1·.2d 684, 687·88 (7th Cir. 1982); fiedler '· lndianhead Truck 
Line, Inc., 670 F.2d 806, 809 (8th Cir. 1982); Naton v. Bank of California, 649 F.2d 691, 698 (9th Cir. 
1981 ); Slatin '·Stanford Research lnst., 590 F.2d 1292, 1296 (4th Cir 1979): Dean v. Am. Sec. In\. 
Co., 559 r.2d 1036, 1039-39 (5th Cir. 1977}; Rogers v. Euon Re~ean.:h & hng'g Co., 550 F2d 834. 
841-42 (3rd Cir. 1977}. 8111 \te Nel\on v. Boatmen's Bunc\hares. lnc .. 26 f'.3d 796,802 (8th Cir. 1994) 
(afftrming award of "compensatory" damages in amount of $74,811 under ADEA; this may have been 
lo\t wages); Cooley'. Carmike Cinemas, Inc., 25 F.3d 1325. 1334-35 (6th Clr. 1994) (upholding award 
2001] LITIGATING ADEA ClAIMS AGAINST GOVT. EMPLOYERS Ill 
injunctive relief could include rcinstatement,s-t an order requiring that an 
applicant be hired,55 front pay as an alternative to reinstatement,~ and/or 
of S 5,000 for ··mental di,tre.,,:· apparently under ADEA. but note that plamtiff included claim under 
Tenne,...:e Human Rlghts Act). 
S-t. Su. t.g., Woodhou-.e v. Magnolia Hosp., 92 F.3d 248. 257-58 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that 
the tnal court did not abu...: it-. discretion in ordering reinstatement. e'en though plaintiffs previoa' 
posttion had been eliminated, becau'e evidence indicated she was qualified to maintain variety of jobs); 
Ptullipp '. ANR Freight Sys., lnc .. 61 F.3d 669, 674 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that there was no abu..e of 
discretion in trial court'\ determination that reinstatement rather than front pay wa~ appropriate ab,ent 
5h<N.1ng that remstatement "a~ e1ther impmcticable or tmpo,-.ible); James v. Se~. Roebuck & Co. 21 
f .3d 9R9. 996-97 ( lOth Cir. 1994) (holding no abuse of di,cretion in ordering reinstatement m'tead of 
front pa}. ab~enr a sho\\ing that ho,tility would make it un\1-orkahle; plaintjffs' refusal to accept 
reirutatcmcnt precludes from pay); Brunnemann ' . Terr.J lot' I. Inc .• 975 F.2d 175, 180 (5th Cir. 1992) 
(holding that absent evidence of animosity or ho-.tility. court did not abu-.e 11s discretion in reinstating 
pl:untiff. even though his position has been filed b) someone ehe); Farber v. Massillon Bd. of Edu~.:., 
90~ F.2d 65,70-71, corrected at917 F.2d 1391, 1396-97 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding that retnstatcment i~ 
clear!} preferred and. absent excepuonal circumstances carefully articulated in record. should be ordered 
in,tead of from pay: workplace tensions insurficient unless they manifest them-ehe~ in public functions 
of l!rnployer): Anderson v. Plulhp-. Petroleum Co .. 861 l-.2d 631. 638 ( 10th Cir. 1988) (holdmg 
rein,tatement clearly appropriate instead of front pay where no hostility exi~ts. plruotiff could have been 
tran,ferred to comparable position and plamtiff was at least 25 years from retirement; trial court must 
ani.:ulate evidence and muonale for awardmg front pay). 
55. See, t.R·· DickeNon v. Delu"-e Check Printen., Inc .. 703 F.2d 276. 279-80 (8th Cir. 1983); 
Left"'ich v Harris-Sto\\e State College, 540 F. Supp. 37,45 (b. D. Mo. 1982), aff'd in part and rn'd in 
parr on orhtr 1:rmmds, 702 F 2d 686, 693 (8th Cir. 1983 ). 
56. See. e.g., Co"- v. Dubuque Bank & Tru" Co., 163 F.3d 492. 498-99 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding 
that be! fore awarding front pay in lieu of reinstatement, trial court is required only to find the animosity 
so extreme that it makes an amjcable and produc tive work relation,.rup tmpoS>.tblc, not that the 
ammo~ity arises from discnminatory ammus); Kelley v. Airborne Freight Corp .. 140 F.3d 335. 352-54 
1 ht Cir. 1998) (holdmg that trial court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting the defendant's po'>t-tnal 
rnmllln a~kiog court to order the plaintiff reinstated in lieu of front pay; the court found that 
reinstatement w~ "impracticable in the extreme" "'here the antipathy the emplo}er's top management 
held for the plaintiff \l-ent heyond the animosity engendered by the litigation, the employer's vilification 
of the plaintiff undennined hi-. 'alue a~ a manager, the plaintifrs supt:f\i~or would be the person \1-ho 
had signed his discharge leuer, and the po~ition offered was indelinite and "make-work" and pan of 
another strategtc move hy the employer); Newhou~e v. McCormick & Co .. Inc .. 110 !-.3d 635. 641-42 
(8th Cir. 1997) (holdmg that trial court did not abuse its discretion in reJecting reinstatement where 
plaintiff testified that he did not thmk he could go back to work for employer becnu~e of strained 
relation~hip: fact that plaintiff Y.a.s rece•vmg Soctal Security retirement henefils due to his inability to 
secure full-ume employment rendered reinstatement impractical): Weaver v. Amoco Prod. Co .. 66 !'.3d 
85. 88-89 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that trial court must articulate reason for it~ conclusion that 
reinstatement wa.<, not feasible); Ray v. l uka Special Mun. Separ.ue Sch Dist., 51 f .3d 1246, 1253-55 
(5th Cir. 1995) (holding no abuse of discretion in dcnymg remstatement, based on discord and 
antagonism that would result and awarding front pay); Acrey v. Am Sheep Indus. A''"· 981 F.2d 1569, 
1576 (lOth Cir. 1992) (holding that. ba...:d on defendant's hosuhty to\1-ard plaintiff. trial court properly 
concluded relationship had been irreparably damaged and that producuve and amicable working 
relationship "~ not feasible: thus award of front pay was not abuse of dtscretion); Price v. Marshall 
Erdman & Assocs., Inc., 966 F.2d 320, 325-26 (7th Cir. 1992) (holdmg that after JUty rejected 
emp(()yer's claun incompetence in finding for plaintiff. trial court cannot then rely on employer·~ 
conunumg belief of mcompetenee m denymg reinstatement; but reinstatement of high-level employee 
performing discretionary functions could lead to con~tant judicial 'upervi\JOn and this justifies de mal of 
rein,tatement unless front pay cannot be computed); Williams v. Valentec Kisco. lnc., 964 F2d 723, 
729-30 (8th Cir. 1992). cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1014 (1992) (holdtng that frulure of plaintiff to reque)t 
reinstatement 10 pleadings is not absolute bar to award of front pay); ELOC v. Ccntuf} Broadcasting 
112 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF EMPLOYMENT & LABOR LAW [Vol. 22:99 
restoration of benefits. 57 Also, attorney fee\ may be awarded.5M Because of 
the limitations on the available relief, state employees seeking to enforce 
the ADEA will want to consider the alternative, addressed in the next 
section, of filing a ~tate court action. 
Corp., 957 F.2d 1446. 1462-64 (7th Cir. 1992) (upholding denial of reinstatement \\here 11 \\Ould have 
dl\rupted opcr.tuon of radio \tatmn and displaced announcer\ cum:ntl) employed. but revcr.mg denial 
of front pay); Reneau v. Wayne Griffin & Son,. Inc., 945 F.2d 869.870 (5th Car 1991) (holdmg that 
award of front pay is appmpriate when rean,tatemem is not fea~ible. even where compl.unt did not 
expressly ~ck front pay); Wil,on' S&L AcquJ\Illnn~ Co., L.P., 940 f .2d 1429, 1438 (lith Cir. 1991) 
(holding that while trial court ha.~ broad discreuon to grant equitable relief. if it refu\C' such relief "it 
mu\t carefully articulate its rationale;" here front pay 'hould have been awarded); Duke v. Uniroyal. 
l.nc .. 92H F.2d 1413, 1421 24 (4th Cir. 1991)(holding that when remstatement 1~ not appropriate, front 
pay is a\ rulable as remedy to avoid potential of future loss); Spulak v. K.Mart Corp., 894 F2d 1150. 
1157-58 ( lOth C1r. 19901 (uphnldmg front pay award. even though remstatement preferred, ha.'ed on 
plaintiffs asscrtaon that he would ha\e problems returning to managerial position becau\C he had been 
humiliated in front of hi' employees and hecauo;e he feared retaliation based on what he t>b\Crved in the 
paM); Brooks v. Woodhne Motor Freight. Inc, 852 F.2d 1061, 1065-66 (8th Car. 1988) (holding that 
di'ttrict court did not abu'e its discretion in awarding front pay in lieu of reinstatement where there wa.~ 
~ubMantial animosity between parties and nature of bu,iness requared high de~ree of mutual trust and 
confidence); Ana.\la~ao v. Schcring Corp., 838 F.2d 701, 70!1 (3rd Cir. 198!1) (holding front pay 
dascretionary); Cooper v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co .• !136 F.2d 15.t4. 1553 (lOth Cir 19!18) (holding that 
fron t pay appropriate where tensaon between plaintiff and defendant precludes reinstatement); Bruno v. 
Wc~tern Elec. Co .. 829 F.2d 957. 966 (10th Cir. 1987) (findmg front pay available a~ a ..ubstitute for 
rein~tatemenl.) 
Wh1le it as clear that ln>nt pay is available under the ADEA. -whether thi' consututes pro,pective 
equitable rehef for purpoo;es of the F.leventh Amendment is less clear. l.n actions under other statute,, 
court~ have decided that front pay, in contmstto rem'tUllement, is barred b) the Eleventh Amendment. 
Su, t>.g •• Campbell v Arkansas Dept. of Corr., 155 F.3d 950, 962 (8th Car. 19981; Blanciak v. 
Allegheny Ludlam Corp .. 77 F. 3d 690, 697-98 (3rd Cir. 1996); Freeman v \1•ch1gan Dept. of State, 808 
I .2d 1174. 1179 (6th Cir. 1987). Howc\er. the-,e caccs are \uspect becau.<.e they did not full:r explore 
the nruure of front pay. \uch as the fact that it is an alternative to the preferred remedy of remstatemcnt 
and i~ U\ually triggered by the employer·, as~rtion that remstatcment is not feasible for "-Cme reason, 
such a~ animosity. If the plaintiff scel..s and as enutlcd to reinstatement.. but the court award' front pay 
becau~ of the employer's resistance to reinstatement, the Eleventh Amendment should not bar the 
alternative forn1 of relief invited by the employer. J ront pay, in th.s situation, ha> either been consented 
to by the employer or it "'· like attorney fee,, ancillary to prospective injunctive relief Su infra note 
58. In F.dt>lman '-Jordan. 415 US. 651 , 668 (1974), the Coun recogm1ed the pemusstble ··ancillary 
effect on the state trea,ury" of prospective injuncti\c relief. ADEA plamtiff' should pur,ue 
reinstatement and address front pay as an alternati\e only after the employer argues that. from lh 
pe~pective. rem\tatement is not fea.,ible. 
57 Sharkey v. La.,mo, 214 F.3d 371. 375 I 2nd Cir. 20001 (finding that plaintifl is ent1tled to lost 
pension benefits, either as a form of equitable reltcf • lo>t ~rvice and ,aJary credits restored to his 
pension plan -or an award of damages to compensate ham for the v·alue ol the lo~t pension benefits); 
Danks v. Tr.t,elers Cos ., 180 F.3d 358. 365 (2nd Cir 1999) (holding that re\lorallon of benefits is 
equitable relief and should be decided by judge, not jury). To les~n Eleventh Amendment concerns, 
ADEA plaintiffs should \eek such relief as part of prospective equitable relief, e.g .. protecung a future 
benefit. 
511 Su 29 U.S C § 626(b). incorporating 29 U.SC § 216{b). Su also Bom: . .,STH'ER AND 
LLv"SO,, STATL AND LOCAL GOVCR."!'.ff.'l C"·ll RIGHTS LtAiltUTY § 7:37 (1987 and 2000 Supp.). 
The Eleventh Amendment doe' not bar a fee award becau'e fees are ancillary to pro~pecuve mJuncuve 
relief. Mi~'ouri v. Jenkins. 491 U.S. 274.279-80 ( 1989). Su aho Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678,693-
97 ( 1978). 
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C. State Court Actions to Enforce the ADEA. 
It appears counterintuitive that an individual's ability to enforce rights 
provided by a federal statute such as the ADEA should depend on the state 
in which the challenged employment decision is made, but this does seem 
to be the effect of the Supreme Court decision in Alden. 59 The Alden Court 
held that Congress, in passing the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), did not 
have the authority to mandate that states open their couru to lawsuits 
brought under that Act.60 This decision marked another major ~tep by a 
five-justice majority purportedly interested in restoring the proper balance 
of power between the federal and state governments.61 The Court reasoned 
that the Eleventh Amendment should not be read literally to bar only suits 
against states in a federal forum.62 Historically, the purpose of the 
Amendment was to clarify that the Constitution did not alter the "universal'' 
doctrine that a sovereign cannot be sued without its consent.63 The Court 
found no evidence in the text or history of the Constitution that the states 
were required "to relinquish this portion of their sovereignty," and it saw no 
basis to restrict the immunity based on the forum.64 Thus, it concluded that 
"the Constitution reserves to the states a constitutional immunity from 
private suits in their own courts which cannot be abrogated by Congress."65 
While the earlier decision of Howlett v. Rose66 indicated that the states 
could not close their doors to Section 1983 claims67 by imposing a state-
created immunity,68 the Court in Alden emphasized that Howlett involved a 
school board, not an arm of the state, and thus the constitutional defense of 
sovereign immunity was not at issue.69 The Court in Howlett simply 
rejected an immunity defense that would have been unavailable to the board 
if the action had been brought in a federal forum.70 Howlett, therefore, 
59. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999). 
60. /d. at 712. 
61. /d. at 748 ("[Ojur federalism requires that Congress treat the State~ in a manner consistent 
with thctr status a.\ residuary sovereign> and joint participants in the governance of the Nation."); /d. at 
758 ("Congress mu~t accord States the esteem due to them as joint participant~ in a federal system."). 
62. /d. at 736 ("[T]hc bare text of the Amendment is not an exhaustive de,cription of the States· 
con,titutional immunity from ~uit"). 
6J. /d. at 715-16. 
64. /d. at 731-48. 
65. /d. at 739-40. The Court clarified that it was addressing only congress10naJ po\l.er under 
Article I. It noted that Secuon 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment may confer broader authority. See 1d. at 
756. 
66. 496 u.s. 356 ( 1990). 
67. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 create~ a cause of action against persons acting under color of state law who 
violate rights created by the Constitution or federal law. See ERWlS CHEMF.RJNSKY. FEDLRAL 
JLRISDICTJOI'. 448 (1999). See also BODL.,.STFTNUAND LtVINSOS. supra note 58. ch. I. 
6&. Howleu v. Ro">C, 496 U.S. at 380-81. 
69. Alden, 527 U.S. at 740. 
70. /d. 
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cannot be read to mean that Congre~~ can open the state courts to suits 
against state~. Rather, it means that state~ cannot discriminate against 
federal claims and cannot change the scope of federally provided rights by 
creating immunity barriers.7 1 
Although rejecting congre~sional power to abrogate the states' 
immunity from private suit in their own courts by Article I legislation, the 
Court recognized that "sovereign immunity bars suit~ only in the absence of 
con-.,ent."72 It proceeded summarily to conclude, however, that Maine had 
not waived its immunity from suit to enforce the FLSA in its own courts 
because the Maine judiciary adheres to the general rule that "a specific 
authority conferred by an enactment of the legislature is requisite if the 
sovereign is to be taken as having shed the protective mantel of 
immunity."7·1 Although Maine had consented to certain classes of o;uits 
while maintaining its immunity from others, there was no evidence that the 
State had ''manipulated its immunity in a systematic fashion to discriminate 
against federal causes of action."74 Applying the Alden analysis to ADEA 
claims, it appears clear that state courts may look to their own law on 
·overeign immunity in detennining whether there has been a waiver 
regarding federal claims, but states cannot discriminate "in a systematic 
71. ld at 754-55. Although the Coun in Alden notes that Congre~~ ha.' broader power to authoru.e 
private suits against non-consenting States pul'\uant to tiS Section 5 enforcement power, the Court's 
holding~ in Bo~rn~. Florida Sa~·mgs Bank and Kimel suggeM that even legislation enacted under Section 
5 is in jeopardy 1 f 11 docs not meet the restrictive "congruence and proporuonality'' te\t. See discussion 
of the~ case<. and their application to the ADA, infra note~ 95-121 and accompanymg text. 
72. /d. at 755. States may also waive their Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal 
coun. but the Supreme Coun has emphasized that an) con~cnt to suit mu'it be "unequivocally 
expres~d" Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 ( 1974). Thus, in Florida D~pl. of Health v. Florida 
Numn~ Hom~ Asl'n, 450 U.S. 147 ( 1981 ). the Coun held that even though Florida la .... specifically 
provided that the Department of Health was a "body corporate" with the capacity to ~uc and be sued, 
thts provision wa1vcd only the State'' common law so~ere1gn 1mmunity, not ih constitutionaJ immunity 
from suit in federal coun under the Eleventh Amendment. S1m1larly. California' s general consent to 
suit, ab>ent a specific waiver applicable to federal eoun. would not eliminate the Eleventh Amendment 
problem. Atascadero St.lte Hosp. ' . Scanlon, 473 V S. 234, 241 (1985}. These cases suggest that a 
state'' general waiver of sovereign immunity may 'UhJCCt it to suit in state court, but that a more 
stringent s1.1ndard is apphed to waive Eleventh Amendment immunity. To date, only one \t.ltc has 
broadly WBJved it' Eleventh Amendment immunny. Su Grotta ' State of Rhode hland, 711 I F.2d 343. 
347 (l st Cir. 1986) (holding that State'\ highc~t coun has authoritatively found that Rhode Island law 
was mtended to wruvc 1mmumty from suit in federal court}. Thus, federal dist'Timmauon claims agamst 
state employers in Rhode hland may be pul'\ued m a federal forum, all hough because of the Supreme 
Coon's later ruhng in Will v. Michigan, 1upra note 21 , the St.ltc itself cannot he named as u defendant in 
a Section 19!13 sutt. Watver will also be found m a ~pec1fic case where the 'tate falls to object and 
proceeds 10 respond to the complaint. Su, e.g., In re Jackson, 184 F.3d 1046, 104!1-50 (9th Cir. 1999} 
(holding that California Fnmchise Tax Board waived it\ Eleventh Amendment immunity when it filed u 
proof or cia 1m for unpaid state income taJtes in a bankruptcy proceeding); Hill v. Bhnd Indus. & Servs 
of \<turyland. 179 F.3d 754, 758-763 (9th Cir 1999) (holding that by defending the case on the merits 
and proc.:eedmg to trial. slate agency unequivocally ind1cated its consent to the jurisdiction of the feder.tl 
coun and waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity). 
n Alden, 527 u.s at 757-58, Citing Cushing\'. Col~fl. 420 A.2d 919. 923 (Me. 1980). 
74 /d. at 758. 
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fashion'' against federal claims when they waive their immunity. Aside 
from these two principles, the Court's abbreviated analysis of the state 
waiver i sue has provided little guidance to state court . 
Since Alden leaves the state courts free to determine their own 
immunity law as long as they do not discriminate, a state that traditionally 
follows a specific waiver rule could decide that ADEA rights can be 
enforced in state court only if the state has waived its immunity to age 
discrimination claims. Some courts in the wake of Alden have interpreted 
their immunity law to require plain, clear, and unmistakable language 
regarding consent to FLSA claims.75 On the other hand, a state with a 
statute prohibiting age discrimination in employment by l-.tate government, 
and providing a right of action in tate court to enforce the law, could not 
close its courts to ADEA claims against the state. To do so would violate 
the anti-discrimination principle set forth in Howlett and Alden. In Howlett, 
the Court empha ized that under the Supremacy Clause, state courts have a 
responsibilit) to enforce federal law "in the ab ence of a valid excuse," and 
concluded that there is no valid excuse for discriminating against federal 
law.76 The petitioners in Alden argued Maine had di criminated against 
federal right!, in violation of Howlett, because the state waived its 
sovereign immunity with respect to certain statutol) wage and hour 
pro\isions while refusing to waive its immunity from suit with regard to 
FLSA's wage and hour provisions. Although the Supreme Court 
summarily concluded that the State had not "manipulated its immunity in a 
systematic fashion to discriminate against federal causes of action," it is 
important to note that the Maine Supreme Court found no waiver because 
the state statute explicitly excluded public employees from the state· s 
overtime provision.77 The Maine Supreme Court, in fact. acknowledged 
that under state law "a legislative waiver of the sovereign'· immunity from 
suit may be found implicit in a general cheme plainly contemplating that 
the State will become party to certain kinds of contracts," but it concluded 
75. For example, m l.tmson 1·. Un11·ulity ofTtnllt\\rt', 2000 'W1 116312 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000). 
the court held that a tarute allowing the Tenne~..ce Claim~ CommJ\\IOn to cntcrtam suits against the 
\tate by employee~ claurung c.lc:privation of ~tatutory rights under Tenne~o..ee law could not provide the 
ba.,is for bringing an Fl.SA chum. The euun rca-.oned that under Tcnne,o.,ee law. any legi~lation 
authori1ing su1L' uguinst the ~tate, \l,hether for monetary or declaratory relief. had to contain plain. clear 
and unmistakable language "as to lea\e nothmg to sunni'e or conjecture." The coun rca\oncd that the 
lcgl',laturc expressly allowed the Chums Commission to ibSUine juri~iction onJ) for claims alleging 
deprivation of state statutory rights, not fcdeml rights. Although arguably this pcnnit~ the Claim\ 
Commission Ill discriminate again<,! federal \tatutory cla1m~. the coun nonetheless concluded that the 
statutory scheme creating the Claim\ Commi~~ion could not be interpreted to reflect suue waiver of i~ 
sovereign immunlly to FLSA claims. 
76. 496 U.S. at 369-81. Su also McKnett v. St. Louh & S.F R. Co .. 292 U.S. 230. 233-3~ 
( 19:l4) ("The federal Constituuon proh1birs state couru of general Juno;diction from rcfu,ing !to hear a 
en~] 'olely bccauo..e the su1t b brought under a federal law.-). 
77. Alden v. Maine. 715 A.2d 172, 175 (Me. 1998). 
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that an implied waiver cannot be found when the legislature makes an 
unambiguous statement preserving the State's sovereign immunity from 
suit.7~ 
The concept of implied state waiver of its immunity may mean that 
litigan~ will have a state forum for vindicating federal statutory rights even 
when the doors to the federal courts have been closed. The Seventh Circuit 
has indeed acknowledged the a\ailability of a state forum regarding claims 
brought against the State of lilinois under the Americans with Disabilities 
Act. In Erickson v. Board of Governors of State Colleges and Universities 
for Northeastem Illinois University,79 it concluded that although the ADA 
was not a valid abrogation of the state's Eleventh Amendment immunity 
from suit in a federal forum, the plaintiff could proceed in state court. The 
Seventh Circuit reasoned that "although states may implement a blanket 
rule of sovereign immunity, Illinois has not done this."80 To the contrary, 
111inois had opened its courts to claims based on state law, including state 
laws prohibiting disability discrimination by units of state government, and 
thus Tllinois could not exclude claims based on federal law. Because 
lilinois had a specific statute prohibiting disability discrimination, the court 
did not address the question whether a more general waiver would suffice. 
However, states without an age discrimination statute, or with a statute that 
provides for administrative enforcement only, will not have to hear ADEA 
claims against the state. This result is ironic in light of Justice O'Connor's 
statement in Kimel that cutting off claims under the ADEA does not leave 
state employees without a remedy since they are "protected by state age 
discrimination statutes, and may recover money damages from their state 
employers, in almost every State of the Union."81 In those states that 
provide no meaningful remedy for age discrimination under state law, the 
absence of a state remedy may actually provide the justification for cutting 
off the federal ADEA remedy in a state forum. This narrow approach 
71!. /d. at 175-76, citmg Drake v. Smith, 390 A.2d 541, 545 . 
79. 207 F.3d 945. 952 (7th Cir. 2000). 
80. /d. 
81. Kimel v. Aorida Bd. of Regen~. 528 U.S 62, 91 (2000). Justice O'Connor's li't of ~tate 
\latutcs in Kimel, 528 U.S at 92 n. • is mtsleading. 1:or eumple. Indiana has a law prohibiting age 
dic;..:rimination. IND. Com,;§ 22-9-2- 1, n uq., but tn defining who is d covered employer the act 
spcctfically excludes any person or government enuty that " subject to the ADEA. Thus, m any case 
where the ADI.:.A upplie~. there ts no ~tate cause of action for age discnm.mation in employment. Su 
Ketti v. Lever Bros. Co .. 563 1 Supp. 230, 233-34 (N D. Ind. 1983) (holding that because suit could he 
brought under federal law. relief under state law is una\ailahle: therefore, Indiana is not a deferral state 
for purposes of the ADEA and age bias claims in lndtana are governed b) the 'honer 180-day 
limitations period). Alter Kim~/. the critical question 1s how to interpret the 'tatutory exclusion of 
employers '\ubject to the federal age dic;crimination in employment act." I'll). COOl!§ 22-9-2-1. If. as 
this anicle contend,, the ADEA i' valid as an enactment under the Commerce <.lause-the EEOC rna) 
enforce the Act in fedeml coun and Indiana state couns may entertam ADEA sut~ against a state 
cmployer-stllte emplo)ers arc villi "subject to" the federal law and the state remedy is vtill unavailable. 
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appears to be the position adopted by a few states interpreting their waiver 
law in the context of post-Alden FLSA claims brought in state court.8~ 
States which have traditionally recognized a broader waiver principle 
should not be permitted to cut off federal statutory claims. Litigants should 
carefully research state law to determine whether it generally allows 
plaintiffs to sue the state.83 Although the Supreme Court in Alden 
82. Su Lawson, supra note 75. Also in Virginia v. Luzik, 524 S.E.2d 871 (Va. 2000), the Virginia 
Supreme Court ruled that only action by the state legislature, and not the conduct of an attorney for the 
commonwealth, cnuld constitute a waiver of the state's sovereign immunity and consent to FLSA suitl>. 
Many states share thi' view. 72 AMJLR STATF.S § 119 (1974, 1999 Supp.) The court then rejected the 
notion that the legislative waiver of immunity regardtng debts owed under a contractual relationship 
could be construed to include claims for unpaid wages by state employees. The court reasoned that even 
if the ~tate waiver statute could be extended to allow FLSA actions, the sutt "wa' not brought in tbe style 
of a contract claam or in the manner pre,cribed for such claims by the statutory scheme.'' fd. at 207. 
Invoking Alden's assertiOn that \0\ ereign immunity was a right reserved to the states by the United 
States Constitutton, the court refu;ed to give a broad interpretation to what 11 dcl>Cribed a.s a hmtted 
waiver of sovereign immunity. /d. at 208. Similarly. in Allen v. Fau1·er, 742 A.2d 594 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 2000}, the court held that Ne\\ Jen.ey's Contractual Liability Act, pursuant to whach !lie\\ 
Jersey waived tl\ so~ere1gn immunity from liability for claims arising from contract di\putes, would not 
constitute the state's waaver of actions brought under the FLSA. First, the court reasoned that plaintiffs 
characterized the defendant\' obligation\ to them as "quasi-contractual," and the statute specifically 
e~cludcd the state'' liability for contr.tcts implied in law. Additionally, the court ruled that even if the 
act could be construed as wa1ving immumty for FLSA claim~. 1l required lihng a nouce of claim within 
90 days, and thus the plaintiffs claim was time-barred. 
Although the Supreme Court's decision in Alden dictates that state law i' critical in asses~ing the 
wruver issue. the notice que\tion i~ less clea r. In Ftlder v. Casey, 4!!7 U.S. 131 (19!!8), the Supreme 
Court held that plamuff<> need not comply with state notice requirements as a precondition to bringing a 
Section 1983 suit in state court. The Court rea.~oned that the notice provision conflicted with the 
remedial objectives of Section 1983, and thus wa.~ pre-empted under the Supremacy Clause. See also 
Rogers v. Saylor, 760 P.2d 232, 238-39 (1988) (holding that Oregon statute that places cap on general 
damages and precludes puniuve damages tn ton actions agam\t a state cannot be applied to Section 1983 
actions brought in a state forum). Superficially, the analysi\ in Felder appears to conflict with that in 
Alden. In Felder, the Court re~oned that although state procedural rules apply to federal claims brought 
in state coun, it also found that the state notice-of-claim statute is "more than a mere rule of 
procedure ... the statute JS a substantive condJ!Jon on the nght to sue governmental officials and 
entities." 487 U.S. at 152. On the other hand, by defimtion Section 1983 claims cannot be brought 
agam.,t a >tate, see Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 ( 1989). and thu.' Felder and its 
progeny do not addre\\ the newly invigor,Jled state sovereign irnrouruty question. 
83. See, e.g. Bachmeier v. Hoffman, I P.3d 1236, (Wyo. 2000). concluding that the State had 
"'aived its sovereign immuOJt)' from an FLSA claim by enacting a limited waiver of immunity under the 
Wyoming Governmental Claims Act. 
The is.,ue of state waiver may be quite complex. For example, the lnd1ana Supreme Court broadly 
abrogated common law sovereign immunity in 1972 and held that lnd1ana could be liable in damage., for 
a breach of duty owed to a private individual. Campbell v. State, 284 N.E.2d 733, 737 (Ind. 1972}. See 
a/.w Burr v. Duckworth, 547 F. Supp. 192, 195 (N.D.lnd. 1982) (holding that Indiana no longer adheres 
to the doctrine of sovereign immunity and thus generally the state cannot assert immunity from habihty 
in state court proceedings for damages re~ulting from the exercise of proprietary or governmental 
functions). Although thi\ appear\ straightforward, the Indiana Supreme Court in Campbell cautioned 
that sovere1gn ammunity remains a viable doctrine for j ud1cial and legislative governmental activities, 
and also cited as authoritall\ e the ba.,ic principle that sovereign immunity conunues to exist for 
d•scretionary acts or omissions. fd. Indiana courts, however, have interpreted the di'>Cretionary function 
exception quite narrowly, and these decisions should not forecloo,e employee' from bringing age 
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recognized that a state may "consent to certain classes of suits while 
maintaining its immunity from others,"84 the question will be how broadly 
or narrow!)' the "class" of suiLs is defined under state la\\ . For example, 
under a broad interpretation the availability of workers' compensation 
claims, wage claims, unemployment compensation claims, wrongful 
discharge claims or any other statutory or common law claims against state 
government would be sufficient to open the door to ADEA claims. 
Although the State of Maine allowed orne wage suits by state employees, 
its highe t court determined that since tate law specifically excluded public 
employees from the overtime provision, Maine had not waived its immunity 
from state or FLSA actions seeking overtime wages even if it recognized 
the doctrine of implied waiver.11~ The Supreme Court in Alden did not 
discrimination claims against a state employer. For example, in Orem ~·. l~·y Tech Statt! Collt!ge, 711 
N.E.2d 1!64 (Ind. App. 1999), the coun permitted u suit against a state college for breach nf contract On 
the other hand, Orrm suggeMs that age discrimmation claims may be characteri£ed as torts ~ince indiana 
law broadly defines a tort as "a legal wrong committed upon a pe!"'>on or propert) mdependcnt of 
contract" ld. atl!6!!. Further. lndtana courts have ruled th:u employee, allegmg "retahatory discharge" 
arc. in es'>ence, bringmg a claim that wuods m tort. B1cn1 v. Bloom, 674 N.E.2d 99!1, 1002-03 l ind 
App. 1996) (holding that retaliatory di~chargc ol an al will employee gl\·es nse to a cau-.e of action m 
tort, rather than a claim for breach of contract). 
Tht~ chamctcriution i~ important hecausc the lnd1ana legislature enacted the Ton Cla1ms Act. IND. 
CODE§ 34-13-3-1. t'f st'q., in respon-.e to Glmpbdl and thi~ Act impo-.e~ several re'>trictioDS on 
government hahility. hN. H grants immunity ~A here the loss re~ull\ from certain li~tcd acti\ itie\, most 
importantly "'the performanc.: of a discretionary fun.:tion ," thus cod1fying the common law notion 
referred to in Campbt!ll. bo. Coot § 34-13-3-3(6). Second. the Act requires that for any cla1m aga1n~1 
the state, notice mu\l he filed within 270 days after the loss occurs,lND. CODE:. § 34-11-3-6 (Mating that, 
as to other political ~uhdivt~lons, notice must be tiled within 180 days, hl> COOL § 34-13-3-8). Third. 
the Act impo\Cs limitations on liahility, i.e .. a cap on compen~atory damage& and a pmhibttion on any 
puniti~e darruges again5t governmental entities. "D. CooF § 34-13-3-4. 
The first restriction, the "discretionary function .. exception, should not be a problem with regan! to 
particularized employment deCI\IOns. Jn Pt!avlu ~·. Mtmrot! Cit.~ Board ofCommissionus, 528 N.E.2d 
40 (Ind. 1981!), the Indiana Supreme Coun ruled that the discretionary funcuons exception "insulate~ 
only tboo;c s1gnificant policy and political decision~ which cannot be as>oCssed by customary ton 
\t.tndards:· /d. at 45. The court emphasized that, "discretionary immunity must be narrowly con .. trued 
because it is an cJtception to the general rule of liahility." /d. at46. Immunity is jusulicd only where the 
tort involves basic planning and policymaking functions. and the go~emment bears the burden of 
showing that a polic} decision where ri~ks and benefits must he balanced hu' occurred. ld at 47. St't' 
also DH \.Worthington Banc,hares, Inc , 728 N.E.:!d 899, 903 (Ind. App. 2000) (deterDllmng whether 
a go,emmcnt act is discretmnary, lnd1ana court~ apply a plann1ng te\1 and asJ.. whether the challenged 
act1molve~ "the formulations ofha,ie policy charo~ctcrized by official judgment, di,creuoo. ~Acighing of 
altemaU\e~. and puhlic policy choices."). 
In short, lndtana court' 'hould be open to ADLA ~u11!. becau e the state has adopted a hroad waiver 
theory, limited onl> by specific ~latutcs. such as the Indiana Ton Cla1ms Act, which are to bc narrow!) 
construed; and employment claims. even if characterited as tort actions. do not fall within any of the 
'wtutory exceptions to the Ton Cla1ms Act. Litiganb ~hould note, however, that wa1ver of 'overe1gn 
immunity may be conditiOned on compliance with the terms of a specific \tatute, and thus notice 
provision and other re\tncuons ~hould he strictly observed State couns have noted the-.e limitation' 
~Aith regard 10 FLSA clatms. See cases d1\cu~~cd .111pm note 82. 
84. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706,758 (1999). 
85. Alden\ . State, 715 A.2d 172. 175 (Me. 1998). 
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address the specifics of Maine law, but the opinion suggests that states will 
be given broad discretion in deciding when they will consent to suit, absent 
evidence "the state has manipulated its immunity in a systematic fashion to 
di ... criminate against federal causes of action."86 Although the Alden Court 
noted that "fm]any States, on their own initiative, have enacted statutes 
consenting to a wide variety of suits," thus purportedly mitigating the 
''rigors of sovereign immunity", the decision has been read by some states 
a~ an invitation to adopt a restrictive approach to the waiver issue.87 
Nonetheless, in those states that have taken a less stringent approach to state 
'overeignty, it may be argued that since civil rights claims are often viewed 
as analogous to state tort claims,88 a broad waiver of governmental 
immunity from state tort claims should be sufficient to open the door to a 
federal statutory claim to enforce the ADEA.89 
This battle will have to be fought in the state courts. Based on Alden, 
the courts of each state will have to determine whether the state has waived 
its immunity to an ADEA claim. Presumably, the determination of the 
highest state court could be reviewed by the U.S. Supreme Court only if 
there is a federal question, e.g., whether there is a discrimination problem.90 
On the other hand, if a state decides that waiver of general tort immunity 
opens its doors to ADEA claims, there would be no basis for Supreme 
Court review.91 
86. Altlen. 527 U.S. at 758. 
87. !d. at 755. Tn the wake of Aldtn, some state courts have overruled earlier decisions rejecting a 
\Overeign immunity defen~e to federal fl..SA chums. Set, e.g., Lawson v. University of Tennessee, 
2000 WL 116312, di\CUS\I!d supra note 75. In this case, the Tennessee Supreme Court held that a state 
employee's action under the FLSA in ~tate court was not barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity, 
but that ruling. the court now reasoned. was premised on a belief - since discredited b} Alden - that 
Congress validly \\aJved the 'tate's immunity. /d. at 3. Others courts, such as the Virginia Supreme 
Court. have relied on Aldtn to JUMify a restrictive interpretation of the waiver 1ssue. Su Virginia v. 
Luz1l.., supra note 82. 
HH. Wilson v. Garcia. 471 U.S. 261. 268-70 (1985). Su also discussion of Indiana law. supra 
note 83. 
89. The federal couns have taken this position when state \O~ereign immunity defenses have been 
raised as a defense to Section 1983 clatm,. Su. e.g., Bishop v. John Doe No.1, 902 F.2d 809. 810 (lOth 
Cir. 1990) (holding that state con-.entto suit in its tort claims acts allows federal c1vil rights actions to be 
commenced 111 state courts, though not in federal court); Weller v. Dept of Soc. Serv's. for Baltimore. 
90 I F.2d 387. 397 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding that the State's waiver of sovereign immunity in tort claims 
preclude~ this defense in § 1983 actions brought 111 state court); Giancola v. State of W. Virgima Dept. 
or Pub. Safet), 830 F.2d 547,552 (4th Cir. 1987) (holdtng that, although insufficient to waive Eleventh 
Amendment immunity, general waiver of sovereign immunity subjects State to suit under Section 1983 
111 \tate court). Although the Supreme Court in Will, supra note 82, has now ruled that state~ are not 
>ubject to suit under Secuon 1983 because Congres\ d1d not intend to include them under that statute, 
the di!>CU\sion of state waiver Ia\\ is still valid. 
90. Murdocl.. v. City of Memphis. 87 U.S. 590 ( 1875). 
91. Michigan'· Long, 463 U.S. 1032. 1039-40 (1983). 
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D. Suits by the EEOC 
The ADEA gives the EEOC authority to bring actions to enforce the 
rights of private individuals92 and, in such actions, the full range of ADEA 
relief is available.9-' Kimel does not change the feasibility of such actions 
brought by the EEOC because the 1974 amendment to the ADEA extending 
it to state and local government is a valid exercise of Congress' Commerce 
Clause power,l).l and because suits by the EEOC are not barred by the 
Eleventh Amendment.95 In an analogous situation, the Supreme Court in 
Alden explicitly recognited that the FLSA remains enforceable against state 
government in actions brought by the U.S. Department of Labor.96 
The decision in Kimel suggests that the EEOC should make actions on 
behalf of state government employees a priority in order to promote the 
intention of Congress to end age discrimination in employment by state 
government. While the EEOC obviously cannot devote all of its litigation 
resources to ADEA claims against state government employers, these suits 
should become a priority because the Kimel limitations on private 
enforcement do not affect state employees with other discrimination 
claims,9" except possibly state employees with ADA claims. 
III. 
PROPOSED COURSES OF ACTION AGAINST STATE AND LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYERS TO ENFORCE FEDERALLY PROTECTED RIGHTS 
OF PERSONS WITH A DISABILITY 
A. Kimel Should not Control the ADA. 
In view of the Court's recent federalism decisions, including those 
dealing with the Eleventh Amendment, it is likely that the result in the 
pending ADA case98 will be controlled by Kimel. Prior to Kimel, several 
9~. 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)' 1); 29 C.ER. § 162615(aX8). HoweH:r, commencement of an action by 
the EEOC tcnmnates the nghtto bring a pnvate acuon. 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)( I l see also Seuino v. City of 
Chtcago, 642 F Supp. 755, 751! (N.D. 111. 1986); Jones v. City of Jonesville, Wi ... , 488 F. Supp. 795. 797 
(0 Wi.,_ 1980) ("[C]Iearly Congrc~' mtended to bar an individlLll ' uit under the ADEA when the EEOC 
had already commenced suit.''). 
9~ Stt', t.g .. EEOC v. O'Grady, 857 F.2d 383. 386 (7th Cir. 1988); EEOC v. Prudential Fed Sav. 
& Loan Admm .. 763 F.2d 1166. 1171-73 (10th Cir 1985), cert. dmitd, 474 U.S. 946 (1985): Jone!> v. 
City of Jonewtlle. Wis .. 488 F. Supp. 795. 797 (D. Wi,. 1980). 
94. Stt supra note 20. 
9S. Aldtn, 527 U.S. at 759-60. 
96. ld. 
97. Fitzpatrick"· Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976) (holdmg that, in extending Title VIJ of Lhe Civil 
Righb Act of 1964 to ~tate government employer<;, Congress abrogated their Eleventh Amendment 
immunity). 
91!. Su .~upro note II. 
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circuits had ruled that Congress acted within its power in extending the 
ADA to include state and local government employers. Decisions from the 
Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits 
all held that the ADA was appropriately enacted by Congress under Section 
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.99 Only the Eighth Circuit had clearly 
ruled otherwise.100 Since Kimel, however, some courts have begun to 
reevaluate the issue. For example, in Erickson v. Board of Governors of 
State Colleges and Uni,·ersities for Northeastern Illinois University, 101 the 
Seventh Circuit reversed its position and concluded that Title I of the ADA 
was not authorized by the enabling clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
because it goes beyond the rationaJ basis test that applies to distinctions on 
the ground of disability and "presumptively forbid[<.,] consideration of 
attributes that the Constitution permits states to consider."101 Other lower 
courts have found this analysis persuasive.103 
There is, however, a strong argument that this result is not dictated by 
Y9. Muller v. Co\tello, 187 F.3d 298. 307-1 1 (2d Cir. 1999) (holdmg thai Congn:~' properly 
abmgated the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity in enactmg the ADA); Ycskcy v. Penn\ylvania 
Dept. of Com., Ill! F-ld 168. 172-73 (3d Cir. 1997) (holdmg that prisoner may ~el.. inJunctive relief 
agam\1 the state under Title II of the ADA); Amos v. Maryland Do:pt. of Pub. Safety & Corr Sen'-· 178 
F.Jd 212.216-23 (4th Ctr. 1999), r~h granted ~n bane, judgment vacated (Dec. 28. 1999) (holdmg that 
the ADA ;, valid exercise of Congre"' po"'er under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and thth 
there is no Eleventh Amendment protection from \uit by disabled state pri,oner...), Coolbaugh v. 
Luui,iana, 136 F.3d 430, 441 5th Cir.), ctrt. denietl, 525 U.S. 819 (1998) (rcJectmg Eleventh 
Amendment immunil) defense); Cro~wford v. lndiana Dept of Corrs., 115 F. 3d 481. 487 (7th Ctr 19971 
(holding that Title ll of the ADA wa' validly enacted under Congres~· Secllon 5 power), Dare v. 
California. 191 F.3d 1167, 1173-76 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that the ADA i~ valid exercise of 
congrl!\\ional authority, and thus 'u11 1s permitted under Title Ill; Mill'tin v. Kansas. 190 F.3d 1120, 
1125·28 (lOth Cir. 1999) (holdmg that the ADA's abrogation of Ele\enth Amendment immunity was a 
vahd exerdo,e of Congress' Sccuon 5 po'.l-er). Seaborn v, flonda Dept. of Corrs., 143 F. 3d 1405, 1407 
( l ith Cir. 1998) (upholding Title ll claim). 
100. Ahbrook v. City of Maum!!lle, 184 F.3d 999, 1005-10 (8th Cir. 1999), em. ~rallied, 528 U.S 
1146, dismissed, 120 S Ct 1265 (2000) (holdmg that Congre" lacked the power to abrogate \tale 
immunity under Title U of the ADA): Do:Bo-e v. Nebro ka. 186 F.3d 1087, 1088 (8th Cir 19991 
(extending Alsbrook to include chums brought under Title I of the ADA). Note that although the Fourth 
Circuit in Amos, supra note 99, generally upheld congres~ional waiver, in 8m11n 1'. Nonh Carolina 
Diwsion of Motor V~hicl~s. 166 F.3d 698, 705-0ii (4th Cir. 19991. 11 mvalidaled an ADA regulation 
proh1bitmg public entities from charging a fee to cover co~t.. of "acce\\ibility programs because it 
found this did not fall within the remedial '-Cope of Congre ' enforcement po'l-er. 
101. 207 F.3d 945, 952 (7th Cir. 2000). 
102. Jd. at 949. The Eighth Circuli ha.s reaffirmed ih previous holdings that both Tule I and Title II 
of the ADA cannot be uMained under the abrogation doctnne. Walker v. Missoun Dept of Corr~ .• 213 
F.3d I 035 (8th Cir. 2000). See a/.w Lav1a v. Penn~ylvania Dept. of Corrs .. 224 F. 3d 190 (3' Cir. 2000) 
(holding that ADA not valid under Secuon 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
103. In Cooley v. Missis.~ippi Dept. of Transp .. 96 r Supp.2d 565 <S D Ml\s. 2000). the court 
predicted that 1f again faced with the issue, the Fifth Circuli "'ould follow the Seventh Circuit'~ lead in 
Erickson and hold that \tale' are immune from damages \Uih under the ADA Compar~ NemaM v. 
Texas, 217 f .3d 275. 280-82 (5 Ctr. 2000) (assuming the ADA as a '1-bole IS w1thm the Section 5 
power of Congre>s, a rcgulauon that goe, beyond requiring states to pro' ide access to their fac1htu~s and 
program' e:~~cee<b Section 5 power). 
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Kime/. 104 The ultimate question of congressional power under Section 5 of 
the Fourteenth Amendment turns on whether the substantive requirements 
of a statute are proportionate to any unconstitutional conduct that the statute 
has targeted.t05 In determining that the ADEA failed this test, the Supreme 
Court in Kimel emphasized three factors: (1) the Supreme Court has never 
found age di-;crimination to be in violation of the equal protection clause; 106 
(2) the legi ·lative record did not identify constitutional violations either 
generally or specificaJly by state government; 07 and (3) the remedy 
imposed by the ADEA w~ disproportionate to any problem identified. 108 
The ADA can be distinguished on all three grounds. 
In Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, lnc., 100 the Supreme Court 
struck down a local ordinance that unconstitutionally discriminated against 
the mentally retarded by requiring a c;pecial use permit for a group home for 
their use, even though such a permit was not required for many similar 
uses. 110 Although the Court insisted that rational basis review governs 
disability claims, it determined the permit requirement "rested on an 
irrational prejudice against the mentally retarded." 111 A close reading of the 
decbion reveals that the Court, in essence, subjected the city's proffered 
reasons in defense of the ordinance to careful scrutiny, concluding that 
irrational fear and prejudice are not sufficient justifications for disability 
t04. The Second Circuli in Kilrullt>n ''· Ntw YorJ.. Stott> Dept. of wbor, 205 F. 3d 77 !2d C1r 2000), 
reartinnc:d us pre-Kiml'l holding that the ADA wa..~ a valid congressional abrogauon ot Ele\enth 
Amendment immunity Similarly. in Botosa11 '.Paul MrNally Rtalty. 216 F.3d 827 (9th Cir 2000). the 
coun arlinnc:d the Ninth Circuit's prc-Kimt>l holdmg that the ADA is a valid c:>.en:1-.e of Congrc.,s' 
power under Scdmn 5 of the Founecnth Amendment. Su also Ci~neros v. Wilwo, 226 F.3d II 13 ( I 0' 
Cir, 2000) (rcaftlnmng the Coun's pre-K1mel holdmp); Davis~. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 96 F Supp 
.2d 1271. 1279 ID Utah 2000) (finding that Kimt>l did not alter the: Tenth C1rcuit po~itton that Congre'' 
validly abrogated the: Eleventh Amendment in enacting the ADA); Schall v Wichita State Univ . 7 P.3d 
1114. 1157 (Kan 20001 ("Recent trend~ would lead us to believe the Supreme Court will hold the ADA 
i\ a congruent <~nd proponional cxen:i'c: of Congrc~~· enforcemc:nl power; under§ .5 of the l·ouneenth 
Amendment, thereby abrogaung Kan,as' <overcign immunity .'"); Jonc., '· Penru.ylvanHI. 1\o. ClV, A. 
99-4212. 2000 \VL 15073 (L.D. Pa. 2000> (holding that Ele,enth Amendment oller.; no protection to 
\tate' from the ADA and a '\trong maJOnty" ha' held likewi~); l.ev.is v.l\ew Mex1co Dept. of Health. 
94 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1228-1229 (D. Nev. Mexico 2()()()) (di\lmgui~lung K11nel and holding Title II ol 
the ADA is a valid cxercio,e of Congress' Section 5 powc"). 
105 Kimel v. nonda Rd. of Regents, 528 US 62. 83 (2000). 
101\. Vance'· Bradley. 440 U.S 93,97 (1979) (holding that federal law that mandated reuremenl at 
age 60 tor panicipant' in the Foretgn Service Retirement Sy~tem was rational bccau~ Congress could 
rca..<Onably believe that conditions ove=a' are more demandmg); Ma~sachusctt' Retirement Bd. v. 
Murgia, 427 U.S. 307.315 (1976) (finding that \tate: law that requ1red police: office!'\ to retire at age 50 
wa., rational since phy,1cal ability generally declines with age). 
107. Kiml'i. 528 U.S. at 89 90. 
W!l. /d. at 90-91. 
109. 473 l'.S. 43:!. (1985). Compare Heller ,., Doe by Doc, 509 U.S. 312 (1993) (upholdmg 
Kentucky's diflerenl standards for involuntary commitment of mentally retarded and mentally ill). 
110. 473 U S. at 450. 
Ill. /d. 
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di,crimination. 112 The Court in Kimel observed that the elderly are less 
likely to be singled out for unconstitutionally discriminatory treatment 
because all persons who live out their normal life ~pan will experience old 
age. 10 In contrast, our society has tended to isolate and segregate 
individuals with disabilities. 
The second way to distinguish Kimel is to look at the legislative 
findings supporting the ADA. The Supreme Court in Kimel determined that 
the legislative record did not reveal either a pattern of age discrimination 
committed by the states or "any discrimination whatsoever that [rises] to the 
level of constitutional violation." 14 The House report on the ADA 
indicated that "inconsistent treatment of people with disabilities by state or 
local government agencies is both inequitable and illogical."" ~ The 
congressional finding~ refer to perva~ive discrimination againc;t persons 
with disabilities by many institutions that are controlled to a significant 
degree by state and local government, uch as education. health services, 
and transportation. 116 In Erickson, Judge Wood noted in a dissenting 
opinion that the congressional findings regarding disability discrimination 
"explain in painstaking detail 'the extent of the evil."117 Further, since the 
Supreme Court in Clebume, in fact, stated that the task of determining 
appropriate treatment of the disabled was one for the legislature, 118 Judge 
Wood argued that deference should be given to the congressional judgment. 
Thus. unlike the ADEA where Congress did not identify "any 
discrimination whatsoever that rose to the level of con'>titutional 
violation,"119 Congress compiled an immense legislative record 
demonstrating the severit.> and pervasiveness of discrimination against 
people with disabilities. 
Third, unlike the ADEA which prohibits all age-ba ed employment 
di'>crimination against per~ons in the protected class. the ADA is a much 
more proportional response to the problem of disability di~crimination. An 
employer is entitled to treat a disabled person differently if there is no 
reasonable accommodation that will permit the individual to do the job. As 
Judge Wood explains in Erickson, "while an employer discriminating on 
the basis of age must demonstrate that it would be 'highly impractical' not 
to do so, an employer making distinctions on the basis of disability need 
112. ld 
113. Ktmt>l. 528 U.S. at 83 85. 
114. /d. 
115. II.R. Rep. l':o 10 1-485 (LI ). at 37 ( 1990). rt>printed in U.S.C CAN 3 19. 
116. 42 L .S.C. § 1210 1(a)( 1). 
117. Erickson v. Board of Governors of SUite College' and Univ. for Northea.,tem Ill. Univ .. 207 
F.3d 945. 958 (7th Cir 2000). 
I ll\. /d. at 957-58. citmg Cft>bumt>. 473 U.S at 442-43. 
119 Kimel v Flonc.Ja Bd of Rcgcntl>, 528 U.S 62. 89 (2000). 
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only show that 'rea~onable steps' of accommodation, such as modifying 
work schedules, training materials, facilities, or policies, will not work."120 
Wood concludes that the incorporation of this reasonable standard in the 
duty to accommodate is "essentially a legislative incorporation of the 
proportionality test required under the Constitution."121 
In short, the ADA only prohibits discrimination against "qualified 
individuals," and it requires only "reasonable accommodations" that do not 
impose an "undue burden" on the employer.122 Further, the Court in Kimel 
recognized the well-established principle that legislation that deters or 
remedies constitutional violations is permitted even if it reaches some 
conduct which is not itself unconstitutional provided Congress is not 
making a substantive constitutional change. 23 The Kimel Court did not 
announce a new test for analyzing whether Congress appropriately 
exercised its Section 5 enforcement power in abrogating states' immunity. 
In fact, it cited case precedent that the circuits had already considered when 
they determined that the ADA was valid}24 There is no reason for these 
circuits to switch their position based on Kimel. 
For these reasons, the Court should hold that Congress' prohibition of 
disability discrimination by state governments as employers is within its 
power conferred by Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and that, 
therefore, Congress' clear abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity in 
suits under the ADA is valid}~ Such a ruling would eliminate the need for 
ADA plaintiffs alleging discrimination by state government to explore the 
alternatives discussed in Section II above.126 
B. Other Federal Claims 
I. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 197 3 
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973127 prohibits 
discrimination against individuals with a disability in "any program or 
activity receiving federal financial assistance."128 The term "program or 
activity" is defined to mean all of the operations of "a department, agency, 
1~. Ericl.snn, 207 F.3d al 957. 
121 /d. 
122. /d. a! 959 
123. Kunel. 528 U.S. al 88-89. 
124. /d. 
125. ~2 usc § 12202. 
126. Whale Secuon ll addresses ADEA claims. each of the altemati'c' \\Ould apply to ADA daim, 
as \\ell, although the arguments may differ. 
127. 29 ti.S.C. § 794. 
128. 29 U.SC. § 794(a) 
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special purpo~e district, or other instrumentality of a !~tate or of a local 
government," or "the entity of such !>tate or local government that 
di tributes such assistance and each department or agency ... to which the 
a i~tance is extended. "129 In Section 504 cases alleging employment 
di crimination, "the standards applied under Title I of the LADA]" shall 
control. 1 '<J Because many agencies or department · of state and local 
government receive federal financial assistance, Section 504 will be a 
u eful alternative to the ADA. 
Plaintiffs alleging disability discrimination by state employees in 
violation of Section 504 are likely to face an Eleventh Amendment defense. 
In Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon. the Court held that the State of 
California could not be sued in federal court for violating the Rehabilitation 
Act. 1 11 Shortly after the decbion in Scanlon, Congress explicitly abrogated 
Eleventh Amendment immunity for suits brought under Section 504, as 
well as other spending statutes. 112 This Act applies "to violations that occur 
in whole or in part after October 21, 1986."1'3 However, based on Kimel, 
state employers sued under Section 504 may argue that Congress did not 
validly abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity. 
Prior to the decision in Kimel. the lower courts routinely upheld the 
power of Congress to eliminate the Eleventh Amendment defense in claims 
brought pursuant to the federal funding statutes.1.\ol Some courts concluded 
that Congress had the power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment 
to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity,''~ while others held that 
Congress permissibly conditioned receipt of federal funds on an 
unambiguous wruver of Eleventh Amendment immunity.1\.., The Supreme 
Court has consistently ruled that Congress has broad power to impose 
12'J. 29 u S.C.§ 794Cbl. incorporating 42 U.S.L § 2000d-4a. 
130. 29 U S.C.§ 794(d). 
131. Atascadero Swte Hosp '. Scanlon, 473 u.S 234. 242 ( 1985). 
m. 42 u.s c § 2000d-7. 
l.l3. 42 u.s c § 2000d-7(h). 
1.~ Su mfra note' 135 and 136. 
m. Su. ~.g. Fuller v. Ra)bum, 161 f .3d 516. 51!! (8th Cir. 1998) (Title Vl), Lc .. age \ State of 
Te.,as, 158 F_ld 213. 216· 19 (5th Cir. 1998), r~' 'don otlru grounds und rtmandtd. 528 U S. I !I { 1999) 
<Title VI); Frank\ v. Kenrucly Sch for the Deaf 1~2 F 3d 360, 362-63 (6th Cir 1998) (Title IX); C:ark 
v. California. 123 f .3d 1267. 1269-71 (9th Cir 1997), em den it'd, 524 U.S. 937 ( 1998) (Secuon 504); 
Lam v. Cumtor. of Univ. of \iissouri. Kansas City Dental Sch .. 122 F.3d 654. 655-56 (8th Cir. 1997} 
(Title IX). 
136. Pedcrwn \ .Louisiana State Univ., 213 f .3d 858, !176 (5th Cir 2000) (Tttle fX), Sando-..ul v. 
Bogan, 197 f.3d 484. 492-500 (II• Cir. 1999) (Title VI), em. grunttd, l2l S. Ct. 28 12000); Lttman v. 
George ~1ason Univ., 186 F.:ld 5~ 549-57 (4th Cir. 1999) (Title IX), Rosa H v San Elinrio lndep. 
Scll Di~t.. 106 F.3d 648.654 (5th Ctr 1997) <Title lXl 
Comport Atascadero State Ho~p. v. Scanlon, 473 US. 23~. 2~7 ( 1985) (holding that men: acceptance: of 
federal fund' doc~ not con\titute a \\<atver; decided before Congre" passed abrogation statute containing 
the "clear language" mand;ited by the Supreme Court decisiOn). 
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conditions on its monetary allotments, t37 and that state sovereignty is not 
violated since states are free to reject the funds.'\8 Provided the terms are 
clear, the program promotes the general welfare, the conditions are properly 
related to the purpose of the expenditure, and the program is not "coercive," 
it wil1 be upheld. 139 In fact, the Court ha~ not invalidated a conditional 
spending program since the 1930's. t40 In light of Kimel and the new 
federalism, reliance on spending power as the source for anti-discrimination 
measures is less problematic, and several courts have now utilized this 
approach in holding that states are subject to suit under Section 504 and 
other federal funding statutes.t4 t 
When suing under Section 504, employees should name the entity that 
receives the federal financial a<>sistance as the defendant.t4:! While 
administrative complaints may be filed with the federal agency disbursing 
the federal funds, 143 exhaustion of such remedies is not required before 
137. See. e.g .. South Dakota v. Dole. 483 U.S. 203 ( 1987). See also Pcnnhurst State Sch. and 
Hosp. v. Haldennan, 451 U.S. I, 17 ( 1981 ); Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444. 461 ( 1978): 
Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 295 (1958). Hehering v. Da\i~. 301 U.S. 619, 
640-4 1 ( 1937); Steward Mach. Co. v. Davi~. 301 U.S. 548. 590 ( 1937); United States v. Butler. 297 u.S 
I, 65 ( 1936). This holding in Dole wa> confUllled in College Savings Bank 1. Florida Prepaid 
Postsecondary Educa/1011 t:fpense Board, 527 U.S. 666.686-87 (1999). 
138. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. at 211; Penhurst State Sch. & Hosp. , 451 U.S. at 17. 
J3Q South Dakota v. Dole, 483 L.S. at 206. 
'4(). See Kathleen M. Sullivan. U11con.llilt11ional Conduiom, 102 HARV. L. RLV., 1413, 1417 
(1989). 
t 41. See supra note 136. 
142. See Kinman v. Omaha Puh. Sch. DisL. 171 1·.3d 607, 610-11 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding that a 
teacher involved in a sexual relation\hip with a student could not be held liable under Title IX in her 
individual capacity); f-loyd v. Wa1ter~. 133 F. 3d 786, 789-90 (II th Cir. 1998) (holding that only gmnt 
recipient, in this case lhe local school district, can be held liable under Title IX); Sm1th v. Metropolitan 
Sch. Di~t. Perry Tp., 128 F.3d 1014, 1018-21 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 951 ( 1998) (holding 
that only grant rec1p1ent can violate Title IX and, therefore, lhe principal and as~istant pnncipal could 
not be ~ued in either !heir indh idual or official capacity; as to lhe official capacity, the Court looked to 
Indiana law and concluded it docs not give principals and as\1~tant principals administrative contml over 
educational programs or activitle\); Grtan v. Charter Ho~p. ofN.W. lnd., 104 F.3d 116, 119-20 (7th Cir. 
1997) (holdmg that employees of rec1p1ent> of federal financial ru.si\tance are not recipients of such 
assistance and, therefore, are not proper defendant' in an action under Scctmn 504); Buchanan v. 
Bolivar, Tenn., 99 F. 3d 1352, 1356 {61h Cir. 1996) (holding that Title VI action could not be maintained 
against individuals responsible for the challenged action, hut only against the cnuty rece1vmg federal 
financ1al a."1stance); Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Disl. 54 F.3d 1447, 1449 (9th Cir. 1995) (explaining 
that lhc lower court held !hat school coun..elor, whose inaction m a peer se·wal harassment case, could 
not be sued a> an individual under Title IX, hut t:ould be sued for Title IX \ iolations lhrough Section 
1983; Court of Appeals did not reach lhe i"ue). 
Compare Grune v. Rodriquez, 176 F.3d 27,33-34 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding. wilhout d1scu~~mg whether 
ind1viduah o.~.ere proper defendants under Section 504, they could not he liable for lmowing inaction m 
the face of discrimination perpetrated hy others, at least where the defendants were not \ Uper. I'OI'> of 
the perpetmtor,); Mennonc v. Gordon, 889 F. Supp. 53, 57 (D. Conn. 1995) (holding that, in a T1tle IX 
action by a female high school student allegmg se11ual harassment hy a male Mudent. a teacher and 
superintendent, who were asked to intervene but refused. had sufficient control over the instirution that 
they were proper defendant~). 
1·13. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-l (fitlc VI); 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (Title IX ): 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(2) 
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proceeding in court.144 The forum ~tate's general personal injuf) statute of 
limitation~ may control , but court~ use a 'ariety of limitations periods. 145 
The full range of relief, including injunctive relief,146 compensatory 
damagcs,147 and attorney fees t48 is available under Section 504; however, 
punitive damages are generally not available. t49 The Seventh Amendment 
right to trial by jury applies to actions for damages under Section 504. 1~0 
Because of the uncertainty about the application of Kimel to the ADA, 
employment discrimination claims against state government should include 
n claim under Section 504, assuming the threshold requirement of federal 
financial assistance is met. tst 
2. Section 1983 - Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
Persons alleging disability discrimination in empiO) ment by state 
government should also consider a Section 1983 claim to enforce the equal 
(mal..ing available the "r~mcdie~. procedure~. and ri11hts ~-et forth in Title Vf' to pc~n' aggrieved by 
the failure of recipient, of federal financial u."i~tancc to comply wtth SecL1on 5~). The federal 
ogencic~ d"tributing the federal funds also ha\e the authonl) to promulgate regulations. Su 42 U.S.C 
§ :!OOOd-llTitle VI); 20 U.S.C § 1682 (Tille IX); 29 U S.C § 794(a) (Rehabilitation Act). 
14-1. Cannon v, Umv. of Ch1cago, 441 t:.S. 677, 706 (1979). Su ulm Bot>t.'IISTD''FR A"'0 
LEVINSON. STATF .\'1,() L<x.'AL GOVERN\ff"Nl CIVIL RIGHTS LLABILITY. § 8 36 ( 1987 and 2000 Supp.). 
14~. For case, u'ing a personolmJU'} statute of hm1tations .. 1u, ~.g., F\erell v. Cnhh County Sch. 
Ot>t., 13R F .3d 1407, 1409-10 (11th Cir. 1998). Southerland v. Hardyoway Mgmt .. Inc .. 41 F.3d 250. 
253-55 (6th Cir. 1995); Cheeney v. Highland Cmly Coli., 15 F 3d 79, 81 (7th Cir. 1994); Bate\ v. Long 
bland R. Co., 997 F 2d 1028. 1036-37 (2d Cu .. cert. d~m~d. 510 U.S 992 (1993): Ual.er ~.Board of 
Regent, ol Kansas. 991 F 2d 628. 631-32 (lOth Cir. 1993); Hickey v. In ing Independence Sch. Dtst, 
976 F.2d 980, 982·84 (5th Cir 1992); Mor.e v. Univ. of Vt., 973 F.2d 122. 124·27 !2d Ctr 1992!; Hall 
' Knnu County Bd of Fduc .. 941 F.2d 402. 407-08 (6th Cir, 1991 ); Fleming v. ew Vorl. Univ., 865 
l .:!d 478.481 n. I (2d Cir 1989) (applymg mo~t appropriate \tate starutc (Lhree-ye.tr)). 
CtJmparc McCullough v Branch Banl.ing & Trust Co., 35 F.3d 127, 130-32 (4th Cir. 1994). em. 
d('llied, 513 U.S. 1151 ( 1995) (holdmg that Secuon 504 acllun' governed by Nnnh Carohna·~ 180-day 
limitation~ period contained in ib statute prohibiting discrimmallon based on dl\uhtluy. since 11 "the 
most anslogou~ state Malute and is not incon'i'tent with federal policies underlymg Sccuon 504): 
Wulsl.y v. Mcd. Coli. of Hampton R<b .. I F.3d 222.224 (4th Cir 1993), cut. d~ni~d. 510 L.S 1073 
(1994) (holding that one-year statute of hmitations in V1rgm•a Rights of Per.on~ With D•..ah•hues Act, 
rather than its rwo-}ear pe11>0nal injllr) \tatute. governs a Section 5~ action I. 
146. BOOtNSTEI-;FR A 'Iii> l.t.VINSON, ST\T!; AND LocAl GO\LR.'I,~IE."<I CIVIl. RIGHTS Ll ·\RO.ITY § 
8:40 ( 1987 and 2000 Supp. ). 
147 /d. at § 8:37 
141!. See 29 U.S.C. § 794a(b). Su also id. at § 8:42 
149. BODF.NSTEINLR ASD LFVI1\SO~. STATE AND LOCAL Go\'F.RN\iENT CIVIL RIGIITS LIABILITY§ 
8:39 (1987 and 2000 Supp.). 
150. Su, ~.g .. Waldrop v S Co. Servs .. Inc .. 24 F.3d 152. 156 () lth Cir. 1994): Pandazidc~ v. 
Virgm1a Bd. ol Educ .. 13 E3d 823.832-33 (4th Cir. 1994); Smith'· Banon. 914 F.2d I.BO. 1337 (9Lh 
Cir 1990). 
1 ~1 Se~ BODF'OSTLL'Iit.:R AND LFVTIIiSOI\, STATE .-\'1,() Loc.-.t. CJOVE.RJ\ML'IIT CiVIl . RtGIITS 
LIABII.ITY § 8:12-8:15 ( 1987 and 2000 Supp.). 
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protection claU',e of the Fourteenth Amendment. m While the Eleventh 
Amendment prohibits such cases against the state or its agencies, 
government ofticials, in their official capacity, are subject to suit for 
prospective relief in accordance with the Ex parte Young doctrine.153 
Further, officials ma:y be sued in their individual capacity for damages1S4 
subject, however, to a possible qualified immunity defense.m The primary 
hurdle in such cases is that only a rational basis standard will be utilized.156 
Although in the context of age discrimination, employees have not fared 
well in establishing that age bias is irrational,m Cleburne holds that certain 
fears and prejudice against the disabled may not withstand even rational 
basis review. 1 ~8 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
Employees of local governmental agencies should have no problem 
enforcing ADEA rights in the same manner as employees of private 
employers. In contrast, enforcement of ADEA rights has become quite 
complex for state employees. However, the options discussed in Section II 
1~2. City of Cleburne\ , Cleburne Livmg Clr .• 473 U.S. 432 (1985). Comp<1r~ Heller v. Doe. 509 
l.J.S. 3 12 ( 1993). 
l~.l See supra notes 44 and 49. 
154. Alden v. Matne, 527 U.S. 706. 757 (1999); Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 2 1, 25-31 (1999). 
155. The 'o-called "good faith" immunity gives government officials an affirmative defense to 
individual liability where the rights a'~rted by the plamuff were not clearly e~tabli~hed at the time of 
the challenged acllon. Su BODF.IIISTF.INER A."'D Lr.VINSON. SlAII! AND LocAl GoVI:.RN~1l!NT Ctvn. 
RIGHTS LIARTI.ITY §§ I :40-1:41 ( 1987 and 2000 Supp. ). An nb\(llute immunity defense is abo available 
to go\ernment official~. ~ued for damages in the1r mdP<tdual capacity, II they were performing 
legislative, judicial or prosccutorial functions when taking the challenged actions ld at§§ 1:36-139. 
The absolute immunity defense generally will not be a\ailable in cases ch.lllen~ing employment 
deci,ion~. Su. ~.g .• Forrc~ter v. White, 4&4 U.S. 219 ( 1988> (holding that ab~olute judicial immunity 
doc~ not extend to judge's decision to terminate employee). 
1S6. Cll) of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr .. 473 L S. 432 ( 1985). 
157. :>u 111pra note 106. However, dc~p1te the deferential standard applied to review cl:um\ of age 
!lias. ~orne lower coun, have found classification' based on age to v10late equal protection. Su Indus. 
Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado v. Romem. 912 P.2d 62, 67 (Colo. 1996) (holding that 
statute pnl\1dmg that permanent total disability benefit\ paid to workers' compensallon claimants 
temlinatc when claimant reaches 65, wh1le allowing all other per.on~ who sustam work-related injuries 
to retain worker>.' compensation benefit~. v1olates equal protecuon provisions of federal and state 
constllutlons); McMahon v. Barclay, 510 F Supp. 1114, 1116 (S.D.N. Y 1981) (holding that New York 
C1vil Sen 1ce Law prohibiting employment of persons over age 29 a~ police office~ wa.' invalid because 
Matute bore no mtional relation~hip to an) legitimate •tate purpo~ and was v10la11ve of equal 
protection). 
1511.. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr .. 473 U.S 432 ( 1985). Su also Martell v. Estado 
Libre A~ociado de Puerto Rico. 4!! 1-. Supp. 2d 81, 89-90 (D P R. 1999) (holdmg that former teacher 
who claimed di,uhility discrimination stated§ 1983 claim ba_<.ed on equal protection); Wright'· City of 
Tampa. 998 L Supp. 1398. 1403 (M.D. Aa. 1998) (den)ing defendant's motion for summary JUdgment 
where plaintiff. a city emplo}ec, claimed disabiliry discrimination in violation of equal protection). 
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above should enable state employees to enforce all, or at least a portion of, 
their rights guaranteed by the ADEA. The fate of state employees with 
ADA claims remains uncertain until the next term of the Supreme Court. 
However, even if the Court decides the ADA is controlled by Kimel, ADA 
plaintiffs will be able to use the alternatives explored in Section II and 
Section III-B. 
